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The Fourth Branch of Government: The Role of Interest Groups, the Media, and Political 
Advertisements in Contemporary Health Policy Debates 
 
Abstract 
 
The first part of this dissertation explores whether interest group-sponsored political 
advertising campaigns influence how journalists frame health policy debates. The paper 
employs propensity score matching techniques, media content analysis and a modified version 
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to discern whether a prodigious and concentrated 
advertising campaign that aired during the health care reform debate under President Obama 
influenced newspaper coverage of the Affordable Care Act in markets that were exposed to 
the advertisements.  
The second part of the dissertation investigates public attitudes toward the various 
groups in the health care industry. It leverages data from an extensive public opinion survey 
conducted during the health care reform debate under President Obama, and employs survey 
weighted ordinal logistic regression models to understand public trust and confidence in a 
broad spectrum of interest groups, ranging from the American Medical Association to Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The findings are particularly important 
and timely as the implementation battles surrounding the Affordable Care Act begin because 
citizens frequently take cues from interest group leaders to make sense of the political world, 
and public opinion frequently depends on how elites frame a particular issue. 
The final portion of the dissertation compares and evaluates several competing policy 
options designed to promote viewpoint diversity in extant policy debates. Several evaluative 
criteria are developed and applied to existing regulatory approaches to improving viewpoint 
diversity, and a novel approach is offered to better serve this ideal. Specifically, I propose a 
 iv!
"marketplace of ideas tax" that would be levied on all political advertisements to endow a 
"marketplace of ideas trust fund," which would then be used to subsidize speech from 
underrepresented viewpoints. This approach leverages insights garnered from models of 
political learning and social science research concerning the role of political advertisements in 
contemporary health policy debates.  
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Chapter 1. Media Framing, Political Advertising, and the Affordable Care Act 
Research on framing, priming and agenda setting has established that the nature of 
media coverage and the framing of issues in the news can powerfully shape policy debates and 
public opinion formation. Previous research has generally provided much less insight, 
however, into the ability of organized interests and political actors to successfully promote 
their preferred issue frames in a dynamic political environment. Moreover, the proliferation of 
interest groups, the prevalence of multimillion-dollar political advertising campaigns, and the 
current battles concerning implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
make this a particularly topical and relevant avenue of research. 
The political advertising campaigns that were sponsored to influence the outcome of 
the debate surrounding the Affordable Care Act provide a useful natural experiment to 
discern whether interest groups are able to affect the tenor and framing of health policy 
debates. In December of 2009, a coalition of national medical societies launched a multi-state 
advertising campaign in opposition to the Affordable Care Act (PR Newswire 2009). The 
advertisements aired in Arkansas, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maine, and 
Nebraska, and were designed to convince voters that the legislation would inappropriately 
expand the role of the federal government and jeopardize patient access to the physician of 
their choice. Consequently, a content analysis of newspaper coverage in these markets can be 
compared to coverage in a comparison group of markets that were not directly exposed to the 
advocacy campaigns to determine whether interest groups can influence journalistic framing 
through political advertisements. 
Literature Review 
The Role of the Media 
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Public opinion research and analyses of the political behavior of the American voter 
frequently depict the electorate as disinterested and uninformed. Consequently, some worry 
that such an electorate will be more susceptible to manipulation and demagoguery, producing 
a political climate in which elite cuing predominates and public opinion is rendered a 
dependent variable in the political process. Writing over fifty years ago, Joseph Schumpeter 
argued against the relative autonomy of public opinion and decried that organized and 
financially advantaged interests would capture the public will such that it had “little, if any, 
independent basis” (1950, 263-264). Writing thirty years ago, MJ Edelman (1977) asserted that 
interest groups use their influence and the mass media to shape opinions and establish specific 
frames of reference in public debates. The proliferation of interest groups and the advent of 
expert political advertising campaigns, such as the campaigns that surrounded the Clinton 
health care reform debate, the Patients’ Bill of Rights legislation, and the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, certainly make these concerns highly relevant to contemporary 
political discourse. In a political landscape that is increasingly characterized by prodigious 
advertising expenditures, it is important to understand how and when political advertisements 
can shape the contours of political debates. 
Modern political communication research has discarded the early hypodermic model 
of public opinion formation and it is generally accepted that political elites cannot 
manufacture public attitudes in accordance with their preferences. Nonetheless, the public 
may be susceptible to more subtle processes of influence due to its significant dependence on 
the media for information. The substantial literature on agenda setting and the role of the 
media suggests that although the media rarely tell the public what to think, they do tell the 
public what to think about (Cohen 1963). There is a strong correlation, for example, between 
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the significance the media place on specific issues and the importance the public attributes to 
them (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  
In addition, the nature of media coverage and the framing of issues in the news can 
powerfully shape policy debates (Price, Tewksbury, and Powers 1995). The standards, terms, 
perspectives, metaphors and visual images used by the media – in short, how an issue is 
framed in the news – “determine what the public thinks it is becoming informed about, which 
in turn often determines how people take sides on political issues” (Zaller 1992, 8). Moreover, 
by highlighting “some aspects of a perceived reality” at the expense of others, a frame can 
“promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993, 52). The framing process is undoubtedly 
important to both public opinion formation and the outcome of policy debates. 
Interest Group Influence 
Interest groups engage in face-to-face lobbying and organize public relations, 
advertising, and grassroots campaigns to frame policy debates and promote their own 
interests. These groups face important constraints, however, when attempting to frame 
debates and influence public opinion. For example, the public is frequently exposed to 
multiple issue frames and problem definitions during political debates, and these competing 
frames will tend to counteract one another and preclude elites from manipulating citizens 
through framing (Druckman 2001a). Perhaps more important, “perceived source credibility is 
a prerequisite for successful framing” (Druckman 2001b, 1054) and the public tends to be 
uninfluenced by the positions of groups that are deemed to be self-interested. In fact, interest 
groups often appear to antagonize the public and elicit an unintended backlash against their 
positions (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey, in Graber 2000). Consequently, interest groups will 
frequently benefit from trying to influence media coverage of policy debates rather than elites or 
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the public directly because source credibility and news coverage are integral to political 
learning (Iyengar and Simon 2000; Krosnick and Kinder 1990).  
Interest groups can act proactively and strategically to maximize the media’s 
responsiveness to their interpretations and frames by promoting frames that adhere to 
established media norms, values, and constraints as well as the conventional criteria of 
newsworthiness (Terkildson et al. 2000). Indeed, previous research indicates that interest 
group efforts to influence media agendas and frames can affect both the volume and tone of 
news coverage for a given issue (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). In addition, interest groups 
can sponsor political advertising campaigns, which can themselves become the focal point of 
policy discussions and can affect the terms that journalists use to discuss policy proposals, the 
questions journalists ask, and the perspectives they choose to emphasize (Brodie 2001; 
Rabinowitz 2010). Some estimates suggest that more than $200 million was spent on political 
advertising during the health care reform debate under President Barack Obama (Alonso-
Zaldivar 2010), and influential groups are also beginning to use paid advertising to shape the 
major implementation battles surrounding the Affordable Care Act (Sparer 2010).  
Despite the volume of interest group activity dedicated to promoting preferred issue 
definitions and shaping policy debates, interest groups are largely reliant on the media to have 
their versions of reality inserted into the public discourse (Terkildson et al. 2000). 
Consequently, the relative autonomy of the media, its own particular biases or framing slants, 
and the ability of interest groups and political actors to influence the framing process have 
important implications for the nature of policy debates and political discourse. Previous 
research has generally provided much less insight into the ability of organized interests and 
political actors to successfully promote their preferred issue frames than it has on how frames 
influence public opinion (Callaghan and Schnell 2001). Numerous scholars have asserted that 
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future research must address this issue systematically to improve our understanding of which 
factors influence the frames the media apply (Scheufele 1999; Entman 2007).  
There is some evidence to suggest that political advertising campaigns can influence 
how the media frame policy debates. In a content analysis of the Patients’ Bill of Rights 
Debate, Rabinowitz determined that political advertising campaigns can affect the tenor and 
framing of newspaper coverage of health policy debates (Rabinowitz 2010). Specifically, 
newspaper coverage was 17 percent less likely to be supportive of managed care reform in 
states subject to advertising campaigns designed to foment opposition to the Patients’ Bill of 
Rights.1 Additional research suggests that framing may be a dynamic process with a temporal 
component (Terkildson et al. 2000; Chong and Druckman 2007). In a content analysis of the 
abortion debate, for example, Terkildson and her colleagues concluded that the media readily 
adopted the frames promoted by interest groups in the early years of the abortion debate, but 
began to increasingly incorporate their own “spin” as the conflict evolved (Terkildson et al. 
2000).  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
When studying media frames as a dependent variable, a key research question is 
whether interest group advertising influences journalistic framing of issues.  Previous research 
has suggested that political advertisements can affect the standards, terms and language 
journalists use to discuss policy proposals as well as the perspectives they choose to emphasize 
(Rabinowitz 2010; Brodie 2001). Thus, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 The study of media framing surrounding the Patients’ Bill of Rights debate is different from the current 
analysis in two important respects. First, the prior study examined media framing in a vastly different public 
opinion context, and left unanswered the question of whether political advertisements can influence media 
framing in a more balanced (as opposed to one-sided) political debate. Second, the prior study examined the 
effect of political advertisements that were aired relatively early in the debate, and left unanswered the 
question of whether there is a temporal dynamic to media framing. Since intensive media content analysis is 
necessarily case specific, the current analysis will enrich our understanding of these processes. 
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Hypothesis: Political advertisements will affect the frames employed 
in media coverage. Specifically, media coverage in markets exposed 
to the critical advertising campaign will be less favorable toward the 
Affordable Care Act.  
 
One of the key contributions that this study makes to the literature is testing this hypothesis in 
a real world political environment. Previous studies touting the effect of political 
advertisements have generally focused on whether the ads influenced public opinion (Brodie 
2001; Jamieson and Cappella, in Graber, McQuail and Norris 1998). In contrast, this study 
examines the antecedent question of whether advertising campaigns influence media framing 
of health policy debates. 
Methodology 
There are four distinct methodological components to this paper. First, I outline the 
research design. Second, I explain the data selection methodology. Third, I discuss how media 
framing is operationalized in this study. Finally, I detail the analytical methods that are used to 
compare media coverage of the policy debate in the treatment and comparison groups. 
Research Design 
Media coverage of the Affordable Care Act was compared in a treatment and 
comparison group to determine whether interest group sponsored advertising campaigns 
influenced the way journalists framed the issue. A key problem of causal inference is how to 
estimate treatment effects in observational studies because the estimate obtained by 
comparing a treatment group with a nonexperimental comparison group could be biased 
(Dehejia and Wahba 2002). In this study, the treatment group consists of the five states in 
which the ad campaigns aired in December of 2009. It is possible that the treatment group will 
differ significantly from the comparison group, however, because the advertising campaigns 
strategically targeted specific states.  
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Propensity score matching methods can be used to correct for bias that stems from 
observable differences between the treatment and comparison groups. In short, propensity 
score matching entails matching treatment states with the comparison states that are most 
similar in terms of their observable characteristics.  
Three key issues arise when implementing propensity score matching procedures: 
whether to match with or without replacement, how many comparison units to match to each 
treated unit, and which matching method to choose. First, this study implements matching 
with replacement. Under this approach, each treatment state is matched to the nearest 
comparison state, regardless of whether that state has been previously selected. This approach 
minimizes the propensity score distance between each comparison state and treatment state, 
and reduces bias (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). Matching without replacement, moreover, makes 
the results sensitive to the order in which the treatment states are matched (Rosenbaum 1995). 
Second, this study matches each treatment state with one comparison state to minimize the 
propensity score distance between each treatment and comparison pair and to decrease the 
bias of the estimates (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). Finally, implementing propensity score 
matching can pose difficulties due to the numerous methods available. To ensure that the 
results of this study are robust, three matching algorithms are employed.  
First, a comparison group is selected using a mahalanobis distance metric. This 
approach seeks to minimize the statistical distance between the treated state and its 
comparison state. Statistical distance is measured by  
 
where u and v are values of the matching variables for treatment state i and potential 
comparator j, and C is the sample covariance matrix of the matching variables from the full set 
of potential comparison states. Next, nearest neighbor matching is implemented to select the 
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comparison group a second time. Under this approach, each treatment state is paired with its 
closest comparison state as measured by the absolute value of the difference between the 
propensity score of the treatment and comparison state. Finally, caliper matching is used to 
select the comparison group as well. This approach is similar to nearest neighbor matching, 
except that it adds a further restriction: each treatment state is still paired with its closest 
comparison state on the basis of propensity scores, but the propensity score for the 
comparison state must be within a predefined radius, or caliper. The objective of caliper 
matching is to avoid poor matches. 
The following statewide demographic, health sector, and political variables were used 
to select the comparison group when implementing the mahalanobis, nearest-neighbor, and 
caliper matching algorithms. 
State Political Ideology: Many conservatives opposed the Affordable Care Act on the 
grounds that it would expand the role of government and create a new, expensive 
mandate. In contrast, many liberals favored the legislation as a needed safeguard 
against rising costs and inequitable insurer activities. Barack Obama’s share of the 
2008 presidential vote was used as a proxy for state political ideology. Ceteris paribus, 
liberal states should cover the Patients’ Bill of Rights debate more favorably than 
conservative states. 
 
Political Competitiveness: The advertising campaigns were not aired haphazardly. Instead, 
they targeted key states. While it is unclear whether politically competitive states 
should cover the legislation more or less favorably, this variable was included as a 
necessary matching variable. It is operationalized as the differential between Barack 
Obama and John McCain’s share of the 2008 presidential vote.   
 
Physicians Per Capita: The number of doctors per capita is intended to measure the 
relative strength of physicians in each state. In light of the vacillating position of 
physicians during the debate, it is unclear whether states with more doctors per capita 
are expected to cover the legislation more favorably.  
 
Percentage of the Population Over 65: Seniors evinced mixed attitudes toward health care 
reform. The AARP, for example, steadily supported the reform process. Many public 
opinion polls, in contrast, revealed that most seniors feared that the legislation would 
weaken Medicare. Because seniors are generally more politically active and vote more 
reliably than other segments of the population, the percentage of the population over 
65 is included as a useful matching variable. 
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HMO Penetration: Managed care organizations roundly criticized the Affordable Care 
Act and several interest groups lobbied extensively against the legislation. Ceteris 
paribus, states with more substantial HMO penetration should provide more negative 
coverage of the debate. 
 
Infant Mortality Rate: This variable is a crude proxy for the overall quality of health care 
delivery in each state. States with a significantly higher infant mortality rate might be 
more amenable to government intervention to improve health care quality. Ceteris 
paribus, media coverage of the bill should be more favorable in states with higher 
infant mortality rates. 
 
Per Capita Income; Percentage of the Population with a College Degree or More: While it is 
unclear how per capita income or educational attainment in a particular state might 
affect media coverage of the debate (e.g., higher incomes and education levels do not 
obviously dictate more or less favorable coverage of the legislation), these 
demographic variables are included as controls.  
 
Percentage of the Population Without Health Insurance: One of the key aims of health care 
reform was to provide health insurance to uninsured individuals. Although the 
uninsured are an archetypal group that suffers from collective action problems, states 
with a higher percentage of uninsured individuals should cover the legislation more 
favorably, ceteris paribus.   
 
Data 
Media coverage of the Affordable Care Act in the treatment and comparison groups 
was obtained from LexisNexis Academic and the LexisNexis newspaper archives. The media 
corpus was selected in three stages. First, the newspaper search was restricted to each of the 
treatment and comparison markets by selecting statewide news sources such as “Arkansas 
News Sources” or “Connecticut News Sources” to obtain stories on the Affordable Care Act 
in specific markets. Second, the query was limited to the period between December 15, 2009 
and January 1, 2010. This time frame encompasses a period of intense media attention and 
interest group activity, including the previously mentioned advertising campaign sponsored by 
the medical societies. 
Finally, because the Affordable Care Act was designed to regulate numerous aspects of 
the health care landscape, stories that do not explicitly mention the legislation but discuss 
health care reform are also expected to influence public attitudes toward the bill. Thus, each 
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newspaper in the five treatment and five comparison states was culled for any stories that 
contained the search terms “Affordable Care Act,” “health care reform,” or “Obamacare.” 
This search yielded 349 stories in the treatment group and 184 stories in the comparison 
group.  
Operational Definition of Framing 
Despite the abundance of research on agenda and frame setting, previous studies have 
lacked clear operationalizations of framing (Scheufele 1999). To develop an operational 
definition, an inventory of frames was developed inductively from media content, public 
discourse, and a review of the literature (Van Gorp 2007). The author and a research assistant 
developed the inventory of frames collaboratively to ensure that the coding scheme was 
robust. An extensive review of media coverage and academic commentary surrounding the 
Affordable Care Act yielded six predominant frames: (1) partisanship, pork barrel politics and 
conflict, (2) social justice, (3) the role of the government, (4) mandates, (5) protecting 
individuals and families, and (6) public opinion. 
Analytical Methods 
After the framing devices (e.g., word choices, metaphors and visual images - see 
Gamson and Lasch 1983) that reflected the organizing and overarching media frames were 
identified, each article was coded by the author. In addition, a research assistant who was blind 
to the treatment and comparison group assignments read and coded 150 articles at random 
from the media corpus (the specific coding categories are indicated in Table 4).2 To analyze 
the differences in media coverage across the treatment and comparison groups, a t-test was 
used to test for the significance of the difference between the means of the matched pairs. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
 The alpha coefficient for intercoder reliability averaged 0.85. 
 
 11!
This study also explores differences in media coverage across the treatment and 
comparison groups in a second way. Following a recent recommendation by Entman (2007), 
the national media can be analogized to a marketplace of ideas. This comparison facilitates the 
use of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), a measure of market concentration used in 
industrial economics, as a way to capture the aggregate slant or bias in media coverage of a 
policy debate. The HHI is calculated by summing the squared market share of each firm that 
competes in the market. For example, a market consisting of four firms with market shares of 
30 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent and 20 percent has an HHI of 2,600 (302 + 302 + 202 + 202). 
If a market is highly concentrated, the HHI value will be higher. The HHI has a value of 
10,000 in the case of a pure monopoly, while it approaches zero in the case of an atomistic 
market. 
The HHI does not permit the analyst to draw conclusions about statistical 
significance. Thus, it is impossible to say that there is a statistically significant difference 
between an HHI of 2,000 and an HHI of 1,000. However, the Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission have developed useful guidelines about how to interpret the HHI.3 
A market with an HHI value below 1,000 is generally regarded as unconcentrated. Markets 
that exhibit an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 are said to be moderately concentrated. Finally, 
a market with an HHI exceeding 1,800 is highly concentrated. While the HHI is limited 
insofar as it does not permit conclusions about statistical significance, distinguishing between 
markets as unconcentrated, moderately concentrated, and highly concentrated can be quite 
elucidating. 
The application of the HHI to measuring media bias is imperfect, however, because 
the HHI assumes that each firm produces the same product. News stories and issue frames, in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
 See, for example, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm. 
 12!
contrast, are likely to be quite heterogeneous. Thus, a modified version of the HHI must be 
used to examine media markets and media bias. If we assume that the “firms” in this market 
are advocates for the legislation (e.g., the White House), an opposition party (e.g., conservative 
legislators or certain medical societies), and a neutral informer (by balancing frames favoring 
each side), an Aggregate News Slant Index (ANSI) can be defined as follows:4 
 ANSI = {(% share of side with highest share of framing paragraphs)2.5 + 
  (% share of side with second highest share of framing paragraphs)2 + 
  (% share of side with lowest share of framing paragraphs)1.5 } x 1/10 
 
A higher ANSI score indicates that media coverage is more heavily slanted toward the 
dominant supplier of information or frames. In the case of a pure monopoly, where all frames 
support the same side of the political debate, the ANSI will assume a value of 10,000. In 
contrast, a market that balances frames perfectly between advocates for the legislation, 
opponents of the legislation, and a neutral informer would assume an ANSI value of 772. 
Consistent with the interpretation of the HHI, ANSI values below 1,000 reflect an 
unconcentrated market, values between 1,000 and 1,800 reflect moderate concentration, and 
values above 1,800 reflect a high degree of concentration. 
Results 
The results of the various matching procedures used are presented in Table 1.1  
Table 1.1: Selection of Comparison Group     
Treatment State 
Mahalanobis 
Matching 
Nearest-Neighbor 
Matching 
Caliper Matching 
Arkansas Kentucky Kentucky Kentucky 
Connecticut New Jersey New Jersey New Jersey 
DC Maryland Maryland  
Maine Rhode Island Rhode Island Rhode Island 
Nebraska North Dakota North Dakota North Dakota 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
 See Entman (2007) pages 167-169 for a more detailed discussion. 
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These results warrant two important observations. First, the nearest-neighbor and 
mahalanobis algorithms yielded identical comparison groups. Consequently, we should be very 
confident that this group represents a valid counterfactual for how media coverage would look 
in the treatment states absent the political advertising campaign. Second, the caliper algorithm 
did not identify a suitable comparison state for the District of Columbia. Recall that the 
objective of caliper matching is to avoid poor matches: each treatment state is paired with its 
closest comparison state on the basis of propensity scores, but the propensity score for the 
comparison state must be within a predefined caliper. The caliper algorithm revealed that the 
propensity scores for Maryland and the District of Columbia were too divergent to satisfy this 
criterion. In order to preserve the integrity of the study and the validity of the statistical 
estimators (Dehejia and Wahba 2002), the District of Columbia will be omitted from the 
treatment group. The comparison group used throughout the remainder of the study is 
reported in Table 1.2.   
Table 1.2: Treatment and Comparison 
Groups 
Treatment State Comparison State 
Arkansas Kentucky 
Connecticut New Jersey 
Maine Rhode Island 
Nebraska North Dakota 
 
The key assumption underlying natural experiments is that assignment to the 
treatment and comparison groups is “as-if” random (Dunning 2008), and balance on the 
observable covariates enables us to attribute differences in newspaper coverage of the political 
debate in the treatment and comparison group to the presence of interest group advertising. 
As Table 1.3 demonstrates, each state in the comparison group is comparable to its 
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counterpart in the treatment group on the basis of income, education, political ideology, and 
health sector profile. Consequently, coverage of health care reform should be homogeneous in 
the treatment and comparison groups to the extent that demographic, political, and industry 
profiles account for content variation. 
Table 1.3: Balance on Observable Covariates     
Matching Variable 
Treatment Group 
Mean 
Comparison Group 
Mean 
P value 
Political Ideology
c
 49.7 51.4 0.77 
Political Competitiveness
c
 18.6 17.1 0.56 
Physicians Per Capita
a
 276 292 0.70 
Percent of the Population Over 65
a
 14.3 13.9 0.50 
HMO Penetration
b
 15.3 14.6 0.93 
Infant Mortality Rate
a
 6.6 6.1 0.45 
Per Capita Income
a
 36,955 37,313 0.94 
Percent with a College Degree
a
 26.7 27.8 0.78 
Percent Uninsured
a
 12.5 13.4 0.65 
Sources: Author's calculations based on data derived from sources as noted  
a U.S. Burea of the Census 2010    
b Interstudy 2010    
c U.S. Election Atlas, available online at http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php 
 
As Table 1.4 reveals, newspaper coverage of the Affordable Care Act did not differ 
significantly across the treatment and comparison groups. Recall that the advertisements 
sponsored by the specialty medical societies were designed to foment opposition to the 
Affordable Care Act, and suggested that the legislation would inappropriately expand the role 
of the federal government.  
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Although newspaper coverage in the treatment group was 7 percent less likely to be 
supportive of health care reform than coverage in the comparison group, the difference failed 
to achieve statistical significance. Moreover, newspaper coverage in the treatment and 
comparison groups was equally likely to suggest that the legislation would inappropriately 
expand the role of the federal government. Consequently, it appears that these particular 
advertisements failed to influence newspaper coverage of the health care reform debate.  
Newspapers in the treatment and comparison groups also framed the debate very 
similarly. The two predominant frames in each market were protecting individuals and families 
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and partisanship, pork barrel politics, and conflict. Interestingly, newspapers in the treatment 
group were significantly more likely than their counterparts in the comparison group to 
employ the frame emphasizing the need to protect individuals and families from escalating 
costs and shameful insurance practices, which might suggest a media backlash against the ads 
in the form of a counter-narrative. Stories in the treatment group were also significantly more 
likely than stories in the comparison group to mention that reform could reduce health 
insurance premiums and costs for individuals and families. Frames highlighting social justice, 
the role of government, mandates, and public opinion were employed equally across the 
treatment and comparison groups. 
 The ANSI also demonstrates that newspaper coverage of the Affordable Care Act was 
not markedly different across the treatment and comparison groups. In each case, the plurality 
of all newspaper paragraphs was supportive of health care reform, and coverage was 
moderately concentrated in each group. In fact, Table 1.5 reveals that coverage of the debate 
in the treatment and comparison groups was distributed approximately evenly across 
supportive, opposed and neutral paragraphs.  
Table 1.5: Aggregate News Slant Index   
  Comparison Group Treatment Group 
Supportive Paragraphs 38% 42% 
Opposed Paragraphs 31% 35% 
Neutral Paragraphs 31% 23% 
ANSI 1,004 1,277 
Degree of Concentration Moderate Moderate 
Source: Author's calculations  
Note: ANSI = Aggregate News Slant Index  
 
Discussion 
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In a political landscape that is increasingly characterized by prodigious advertising 
expenditures, it is important to understand how and when interest groups are able to shape 
the contours of political debates. Previous research has suggested that political advertising 
campaigns can affect the tenor and framing of newspaper coverage of health policy debates 
(Rabinowitz 2010), as well as the terms that journalists use to discuss policy proposals, the 
questions journalists ask, and the perspectives they choose to emphasize (Brodie 2001). The 
results of this study suggest that not all political debates and advertising campaigns are created 
equal. Although some campaigns may indeed influence journalistic framing of health policy 
debates, others might exert little or no influence at all. The obvious question presented, 
therefore, is why some advertising campaigns influence media framing while others do not. 
Although it is not possible to posit concrete causal explanations due to the quasi-experimental 
nature of this study, several important observations can be made. 
Perhaps the most likely reason that the advertising campaign sponsored by the 
national medical societies failed to influence journalistic framing of the health care reform 
debate was that the ads were aired too late in the debate. Previous research has suggested that 
framing effects are less likely for established issues that already have clear terms of debate 
(Chong and Druckman 2007; Terkildson et. al 2000). Health care reform was a major issue 
during the 2008 presidential campaign (Blendon and Benson 2009), and it seems very plausible 
that the terms of debate were already firmly established in the 14 months before the 
advertisements sponsored by the medical specialty societies were disseminated.  
The next most plausible explanation for why this advertising campaign failed to 
influence media framing of the policy debate is that public opinion was relatively evenly 
divided and newspaper coverage of the debate was already extremely balanced when the 
advertisements were aired. During the Patients Bill of Rights debate in 1998 and 1999, for 
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example, newspaper coverage was 17 percent less likely to be supportive of managed care 
reform in states subject to advertising campaigns designed to foment opposition to the 
legislation (Rabinowitz 2010). It may have been relatively easy for those opposition 
advertisements to influence media framing, however, because 87 percent of all stories and 55 
percent of all paragraphs in the comparison group were supportive of managed care reform 
(Rabinowitz 2010). Consequently, the advertisements may have presented an opportunity for 
journalists to discuss an underrepresented perspective, thereby promoting journalistic norms 
like fairness, accuracy and balance (Bennett 1996). In contrast, as Tables 1.4 and 1.5 reveal, 
only 58 percent of all stories and 38 percent of all paragraphs in the comparison group were 
supportive of the Affordable Care Act. The ads sponsored by the medial specialty societies 
might not have exerted a framing effect, therefore, because coverage already adhered to 
journalistic norms regarding fairness and balance. 
In addition to the two explanations offered above, there are also two alternative 
hypotheses that might explain why the ads sponsored by the medical societies failed to affect 
media framing. First, the campaign may have failed to influence media framing of the health 
care reform debate because the debate was simply too prolific. The public is often exposed to 
multiple issue frames and problem definitions during political debates, and these competing 
frames can counteract one another and preclude elites from manipulating citizens through 
framing (Druckman 2001a). If a sufficient number of interest groups, politicians and other 
elites promote a myriad of issue frames during a particular debate, it seems plausible that these 
frames will counteract one another and prevent any given frame from exerting a strong 
influence on journalistic framing of the debate.  
It may have been relatively easy for the ads sponsored during the Patients’ Bill of 
Rights debate to influence media framing, for example, because the advertising campaigns 
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surrounding that debate were one-sided. The Clinton Administration was the only group 
actively lobbying in support of the legislation. In contrast, myriad groups sponsored 
advertisements both for and against the Affordable Care Act. Whereas the national coalition 
of medical societies opposed the legislation, a coalition consisting of the AMA, Families USA, 
the Federation of American Hospitals, PhRMA, and the SEIU sponsored prodigious 
advertisements in support of reform (to cite just one example). It would be unsurprising that 
the campaign sponsored by the medical societies failed to influence media framing if media 
coverage is a function of the balance between favorable and unfavorable campaigns.  
One reason to be suspicious of this explanation, however, is that some advertisements 
manage to shape even the most prolific political debates. During the health care reform debate 
in 1993 and 1994, for example, 650 interest groups and organizations spent in excess of $100 
million to influence the policy debate and its outcome (West, Heath, and Goodwin 1996). 
Despite the prodigious advertising expenditures that surrounded that debate, the fabled Harry 
and Louise advertisements still managed to permeate the public consciousness and shape the 
contours of debate (Brodie 2001; Jamieson and Cappella 1998).  
 Another unconvincing explanation for the ineffectiveness of the advertising campaign 
is that it simply may have been subpar. If the media are more likely to incorporate frames that 
conform to established media norms, values and constraints as well as the conventional 
criteria of newsworthiness (Terkildson et al. 2000), then an advertisement that neglects these 
norms and values might fail to influence journalistic framing of the policy debate. In the case 
of the advertisements sponsored by the medical specialty societies during the Affordable Care 
Act, however, the advertisements did not ignore conventional norms and values. On the 
contrary, the advertisements invoked many of the themes and styles that have been successful 
in previous advertising campaigns. 
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Future research should attempt to further disentangle the relative merit of these 
explanations for why some advertising campaigns influence journalistic framing while others 
do not. Specifically, future research should incorporate a temporal element into the analysis. 
Studying media framing at various points in the same policy debate would permit the author 
to more definitively test the proposition that framing effects are less likely for established 
issues. In addition, future research should begin to explore the effect of political 
advertisements on media framing in different public opinion contexts. Is it indeed the case 
that framing effects are less likely for issues on which the public is relatively evenly divided? 
Although this article provides important empirical support for the proposition that 
interest groups are not always able to influence media framing of health policy debates 
through the use of political advertising, there are several important limitations to this study. 
First, I examine only newspaper coverage of the Affordable Care Act. However, television is 
the primary source of political information for most Americans (Franklin-Fowler et. al 2007), 
and the average American watches over 5 hours of television per day (Nielson 2009). To gain 
a more complete understanding of how political advertisements affect media coverage, the 
framing of policy debates and public opinion formation, it is important for future research to 
address television coverage as well as newspaper coverage. 
Another key limitation of this study is that interest group influence likely varies 
depending on the scope, campaign visibility, and ideological cast of the issue involved 
(Kingdon 1995). Thus the (in)ability of interest groups to influence the framing of the 
Affordable Care Act might not be generalizable to policy debates that do not involve highly 
visible campaign issues, a strong ideological component, and the particular constellation of 
organizations mobilized during this debate. Because every contentious political debate is 
unique, it is difficult to recommend anything beyond a careful and deliberate case-by-case 
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analysis of health policy debates to improve our understanding of when interest groups can 
and cannot influence media framing. 
Despite these limitations, the results of this study still appear to be important because 
political advertising has become a mainstay in contemporary political debates. Consequently, it 
is important to understand how and when interest groups are able to shape the contours of 
policy debates through the use of political advertising campaigns. It is equally vital, however, 
for students of political behavior and politics to understand when interest groups are not able 
to influence the tenor of extant political debates.  
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Chapter 2. Public Attitudes Toward Interest Groups in the Health Care Industry  
What does the American public think about the various stakeholders and interest 
groups in the health care industry? This question is particularly important as the 
implementation battles surrounding the Affordable Care Act begin because citizens frequently 
take cues from interest group leaders to make sense of the political world (Lau and Redlawsk 
2001), and public opinion frequently depends on how elites frame a particular issue 
(Druckman 2001). Unfortunately, previous research has generally treated interest groups as a 
homogenous morass, and scholars frequently make broad generalizations about interest group 
activities (see, e.g., Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 2000). The little that we do know about public 
attitudes toward interest groups in the health care sector is focused almost exclusively on 
physician groups, and was distilled in a markedly different sociopolitical and health care 
environment (see, e.g., Pescosolido, Tuch and Martin 2001). This article empirically 
investigates public attitudes toward the various groups in the health care industry. It leverages 
data from an extensive public opinion survey conducted during the health care reform debate 
under President Obama. The results provide insight into levels of trust and confidence in a 
broad spectrum of interest groups, ranging from the American Medical Association (AMA) to 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BCBS) to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
Literature Review 
Research on the use of cognitive heuristics in political decision-making suggests that 
humans are “cognitive misers” who employ informational shortcuts to make reasonable 
decisions without expending too much cognitive effort (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). An 
individual might rely on endorsements from trusted political elites, for example, to evaluate a 
candidate or policy (Brady and Sniderman 1985). However, citizens often lack the contextual 
knowledge needed to use heuristics intelligently (Kuklinski and Hurley 1994, 1996; Delli 
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Carpini and Keeter 1996). Consequently, some worry that voters will resort to “simple-minded 
and sometimes misguided considerations of self-interest” to make sense of complex public 
policy issues (Bartels 2005, 21).  
The potential for members of the public to misperceive their own self-interest in a 
public policy debate was evident in low-income seniors’ opposition to the Medicare 
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. The Act was designed to protect seniors against the 
economic consequences of catastrophic illness. Congress imposed higher premiums on 
seniors – particularly the affluent - to finance the benefits expansion. Objective self-interest 
notwithstanding, low-income seniors agitated against the law (Campbell 2003). One 
explanation for this surprising opposition was that low-income seniors did not understand the 
law’s provisions, and thus misjudged their self-interest (Campbell 2003). The chasm between 
objective and subjective self-interest surrounding the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act 
illustrates the immense potential that interest groups have to frame health policy debates and 
shape public perceptions. The chasm also reveals the need for the proponents of a policy or 
program to clearly communicate the nature of the program and its benefits to potential 
constituencies (Campbell 2003). 
Despite the need and opportunity for interest groups to play an information-brokering 
role in our political system, not all groups can promote novel frames in health policy debates. 
Elites face important constraints when trying to frame public policy debates. Perceived source 
credibility is a key prerequisite for successful issue framing, and the public tends to be 
uninfluenced by the positions of groups that are deemed to be self-interested (Druckman 
2001). The question presented, therefore, is which interest groups and stakeholders in the 
health care landscape possess the necessary credibility to engage in issue framing, shape public 
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perceptions, and communicate important political information to voters. What factors 
influence public attitudes toward interest groups in the health care sector? 
It is commonly assumed that self-interest is an important determinant of political 
attitudes and preferences (Feldman 1982). In fact, the belief that self-interest is a key 
motivator of human behavior has occupied a central place in Western thought for centuries 
(Mansbridge 1990). In the context of American politics, the self-interest thesis has taken 
several forms. In The American Voter, for example, Campbell et al. (1960) concluded that 
Americans typically respond to domestic issues on the basis of “primitive self-interest” and 
“fairly concrete and short-term group interest” (205, 233). Another incarnation of the thesis 
posits that people “vote their pocketbooks” (Tufte 1978), which meshes with definitions of 
self-interest that emphasize the individual’s material welfare in the short to medium-term 
(Sears and Funk 1990). Other scholars have suggested that egoistically-based group interest – 
interdependence between self and group outcomes – is a potent determinant of political 
attitudes and preferences because interest groups respond intensely to the interests of their 
organizations (Sears and Funk 1990). 
Previous studies of public attitudes toward physicians bolster the validity of the self-
interest thesis. Pescosolido, Tuch and Martin (2001), for example, found that while levels of 
public confidence in physicians are relatively high overall, several subgroups of the population 
are significantly more negative in their assessment of physicians. Specifically, younger 
respondents, respondents with lower levels of education, and respondents who report poorer 
health or a lack of health insurance all report more negative attitudes toward physicians 
(Pescosolido, Tuch and Martin 2001). In short, those without institutional access to the health 
care system express more negative attitudes toward physicians, which tends to corroborate the 
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self-interest hypothesis because these disenfranchised groups may view their interests as 
adverse to those of the medico-industrial complex. 
A prodigious body of research also suggests that “symbolic politics” or “symbolic 
predispositions” exert a strong effect on sociopolitical attitudes (Sears and Funk 1990). 
Symbolic predispositions, including party identification and political ideology, are generally 
described as stable affective preferences acquired through conditioning in early life (Sears, 
Hensler, and Speer 1979). These learned responses subsequently influence adult attitudes 
toward extant political stimuli (Sears and Funk 1990). Symbolic predispositions will likely 
affect how the public perceives the stakeholders in the health care industry because many of 
these groups have been politicized and identified with particular parties. Consequently, 
partisanship and political ideology will likely shape attitudes toward these groups. 
Research into the dimensions, levels, and determinants of trust in various institutions 
also provides insight into how the public might perceive key stakeholders in the health care 
industry. If trust is defined as the expectation of beneficence from another party (Gambetta 
1998), then certain intrinsic aspects of the clinician-patient relationship suggest that the public 
will trust health care providers (Goold 2001). For example, nurses and physicians are expected 
to be patient advocates, and trust is essential for a patient to divulge personal information or 
submit to examination and treatment (Goold 2001). Moreover, the medical profession has 
been extraordinarily successful in cultivating the belief that doctors writ large are competent 
and trustworthy (Mechanic 1998). In contrast, many health care institutions operate as 
businesses in a market-based system, characterizing their relationships as contractual 
obligations rather than ethical or fiduciary ones (Goold 2001). The focus on profitability and 
marketplace concerns likely detract from public trust in these institutions. Consequently, for-
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profit groups may enjoy lower levels of trust than health care professionals or non-profit 
organizations. 
Finally, research on the determinants of trust has suggested that a sense of shared 
values can inculcate identification-based trust (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Specifically, the 
perception that a trustee has internalized the truster’s preferences due to a sense of shared 
values can produce trust in that individual or institution. The trust relationship can also be 
affected by perceived sameness or difference (Goold 2001). Thus, women may distrust an 
organization dominated by men, or the elderly may trust a group comprised entirely of other 
elderly individuals.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 Despite the importance of understanding public perceptions of different interest 
groups, previous studies have not empirically investigated public attitudes toward the myriad 
groups in the health care landscape. The obvious question presented, therefore, is how does 
the public feel about the key stakeholders and groups in the health care sector. Does the 
public trust certain health care interest groups more than others? For example, are 
professional groups more trusted than commercial or for-profit organizations? Do levels of 
trust in different groups vary based on partisan and demographic variables? Finally, do 
personal experiences with the health care system – whether due to employment in the industry 
or negative experiences associated with not having insurance – influence public perceptions of 
key interest groups?   
This article tests four key hypotheses. First, the literature on the determinants of 
institutional trust suggests that the public should exhibit higher levels of trust and confidence 
in health care providers than other institutional actors. Specifically, the public will likely 
display lower levels of trust and confidence in actors with a commercial or marketplace focus, 
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such as health insurers, large corporations, and pharmaceutical companies. The commercial 
orientation hypothesis thus suggests that health care professionals and non-profit 
organizations should enjoy the highest levels of support in the health care sector. 
Second, the symbolic politics thesis suggests that party identification and political 
ideology will affect how the public perceives the stakeholders and interest groups in the health 
care industry. Prevailing wisdom suggests, for example, that Republicans will likely exhibit 
higher levels of trust in business groups than Democrats. To move beyond casual 
suppositions and formally operationalize the symbolic politics thesis, however, I examined 
publicly available campaign finance data from the past 6 election cycles to determine which 
interest groups in the health care sector have an overriding partisan affiliation.  
Two groups exhibit a strong affiliation with the Republican Party. The U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce and National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) each contributed 
overwhelmingly to Republican candidates for federal office during the past 6 election cycles. 
To the extent that Republican voters are aware of these groups’ partisan predispositions – and 
the prevailing political climate suggests that they are – we would expect them to view the 
groups more favorably than Democratic voters. Similarly, the American Nurses Association 
(ANA), AFL-CIO, Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and AARP each 
contributed disproportionately to Democratic candidates for federal office. To the extent that 
Democratic voters are aware of these groups’ partisan predispositions, we would expect them 
to view the groups more favorably than Republican voters.  
Third, research on the importance of self-interest in attitude formation and the study 
conducted by Pescosolido, Tuch and Martin (2001) suggests that youth, lower levels of 
education, poorer health status and a lack of insurance will be associated with more negative 
assessments of physicians. Although data constraints precluded these authors from examining 
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public attitudes toward other health care providers, it seems reasonable to expect that those 
without institutional access to the health care system might feel similarly disenchanted with 
other providers, including nurses, hospitals, and health insurance companies. In each case, 
those without institutional access to the health care system might project feelings of anger, 
bewilderment, fear and confusion onto the various points of contact they do have with the 
medico-industrial complex. 
Fourth, theories of attitude formation that emphasize the importance of egoistically-
based group interest and identification-based trust suggest several hypotheses about how 
various subgroups of the public might perceive key health care stakeholders. For example, we 
might expect union members to exhibit higher levels of trust and confidence in the AFL-CIO, 
SEIU and labor unions than other segments of the public. Similarly, the elderly should exhibit 
more trust and confidence in the AARP and groups representing the elderly than other 
segments of the population. Finally, individuals who work in the health care field – e.g., as a 
physician, nurse, pharmacist, or hospital worker – should have higher levels of trust and 
confidence in health care providers than other segments of the public. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the hypotheses that are tested in this study. Beyond these basic 
intuitions, however, it is very difficult to hazard a guess about which factors will predict 
support for other stakeholders in the health care industry. The difficulty of formulating 
hypotheses about public attitudes toward specific interest groups highlights the paucity of 
existing research. 
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The dearth of existing research on public attitudes toward health care interest groups 
raises an ancillary question as well: do public attitudes toward interest groups in the health care 
industry change when these groups are identified by a generic label as opposed to a particular 
name? For example, is support for doctor groups synonymous with support for the AMA? Is 
support for health insurance companies synonymous with support for America’s Health 
Insurance Plans (AHIP)? This question is particularly timely and important in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which upheld 
the disclaimer and disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act governing 
electioneering communications.5 Absent any strong empirical or theoretical expectations to 
the contrary, this paper tests the null hypothesis that attitudes toward interest groups are 
identical irrespective of the label used to describe the group. 
Survey Data and Methods 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
 An electioneering communication is defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “refers 
to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a 
general election. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006 ed.). 
Table 2.1. Summary of Hypotheses
5. Group Name: Public attitudes toward interest groups in the health care industry will not change when 
these groups are identified by a generic label as opposed to a particular name (e.g., groups representing 
seniors versus AARP).
1. Commercial Orientation: The public will exhibit higher levels of trust and confidence in groups 
representing professionals or non-profit organizations than their commercial counterparts.
2. Partisanship: Partisanship will influence levels of trust and confidence in groups that have been 
politicized, including the American Nurses Association, AFL-CIO, Service Members International Union, 
AARP, Chamber of Commerce, and National Federation of Independent Businesses.
4. Group Identification: Identification-based trust and egoistically-based group interest will influence 
levels of trust and confidence in various groups. For example, health care workers will exhibit higher 
levels of trust in the AAP, AMA, ANA, doctors groups, and nurses groups than other members of the 
public.
3. Self-Interest: Self-interest will influence public attitudes toward interest groups. Individuals without 
institutional access to health care - respondents who are younger, have lower levels of education, report 
poorer health or a lack of health insurance - will exhibit lower levels of trust and confidence in all sectors 
of the medico-industrial complex.
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Survey Data 
The data used in this article are from a survey of a nationally representative sample of 
1,278 adults age eighteen and older, conducted in the middle of the health care reform debate 
under President Obama between August 27 and September 13, 2009. The survey was designed 
jointly by National Public Radio, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Harvard School of 
Public Health. It examines the public’s opinions about the role of different health care interest 
groups in the federal health care reform debate. Specifically, respondents were asked how 
much confidence they have in different stakeholders and interest groups to recommend the 
right thing for the country when it comes to health care. A random half of the sample was 
asked about specific interest groups (e.g., the AMA or the AFL-CIO) while the other half was 
asked about generic groups (e.g., doctors groups or labor unions). 
Methods 
This study employs survey weighted ordinal logistic regression models to regress 
confidence in each interest group on several covariates. Specifically, I examine the effect of 
demographic, symbolic and self-interest variables on public attitudes toward the myriad 
stakeholders and interest groups in the health care sector.  
Several key covariates have been included in every regression model. Specifically, the 
following demographic and symbolic variables were included in every model: age, education, 
income, gender, party identification, political ideology, and race. 6  Health status7 and insurance 
status were also included in every regression model because the thesis advanced by 
Pescosolido, Tuch and Martin (2001) – that those without institutional access to the health 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
 These variables have been operationalized as follows: age is a categorical variable that includes 18-29, 30-49, 50-
64, and 65+; education is a categorical variable that includes some high school or less, graduated high school, 
some college, graduated college or more; income is a categorical variable that includes <$20,000, $20,000-40,000, 
$40,000-75,000, $75,000-100,000; and $100,000+; party identification is a categorical variable that includes 
Democrat, Republican, and Independent; political ideology is a categorical variable that includes liberal, moderate 
and conservative. 
7
 Health status is a categorical variable that includes fair or poor, good, and very good or excellent. 
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care system report more negative sentiments about physicians than those with access – has 
not previously been tested on a robust and diverse dataset. Including health status and 
insurance status in every regression model will facilitate the extension of the institutional 
access hypothesis to other stakeholders in the health care industry. 
Several additional self-interest variables were also included in a more limited set of 
regression models as appropriate. For example, union membership was included in the models 
measuring attitudes toward the AFL-CIO, SEIU, and labor unions to capture the potential 
effect of egoistically-based group interest on political attitudes. Union membership was also 
included in the regression models measuring attitudes toward large and small businesses since 
egoistically-based group interest might influence political attitudes in a negative or adversarial 
way as well. Similarly, employment as a health worker was included in the models for the 
AAP, AHA, AHIP, AMA, ANA, BCBS, doctors groups, nurses groups, health insurance 
companies, and hospitals. 
Interaction terms were also included in several regression models when appropriate. 
Recall, for example, that the ANA, AFL-CIO, SEIU, and AARP each contributed 
overwhelmingly to Democratic candidates for federal office during the past six election cycles. 
I hypothesized that Democratic voters who are aware of these groups’ partisan 
predispositions should view the groups more favorably than Republican voters. To test this 
hypothesis, I included an interaction term for party identification and political awareness in 
the models for these interest groups. The interaction terms tests the hypothesis that politically 
aware respondents may better notice the partisan linkage required to translate preexisting 
symbolic predispositions into political attitudes. I included a similar interaction term in the 
models for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, NFIB, and groups representing small and large 
corporations for the same reason. Political awareness has been operationalized as how closely 
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the respondent followed the discussion in Washington about proposed changes to the health 
care system. 
 Finally, I ran a series of parsimonious regressions to test the hypothesis that public 
attitudes will not be affected by the use of a generic label to describe the stakeholder as 
opposed to a specific interest group name. In these models, I merged the split sample 
responses for each stakeholder and regressed attitudes on a dichotomous treatment measure 
that indicates whether the respondent was asked about the generic group or not. For example, 
attitudes toward groups representing seniors and the AARP were merged into one regression 
model, and a dichotomous variable captures whether the respondent was asked about seniors 
groups.  
Results 
 As Chart 2.1 reveals, the myriad stakeholders and interest groups in the health care 
sector enjoy widely disparate levels of public support. At one extreme, nurses groups enjoy the 
highest level of public support among the 26 groups included in the survey. Specifically, 79.4 
percent of the public expressed either a great deal or a fair amount of confidence in nurses 
groups to recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care. At the 
other extreme, only 23.1 percent of the public expressed confidence in Wal-Mart to 
recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care.  
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In total, 10 groups enjoyed support from at least 60 percent of the public. Groups 
representing health care professionals and patients enjoyed the highest levels of public trust 
and confidence. The most trusted groups in the survey were nurses groups, the American 
Cancer Society (“ACS”), groups representing patients, the American Nurses Association 
(“ANA”), the American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”), doctors groups, groups representing 
senior citizens, and the American Medical Association (“AMA”). At the other extreme, 8 
groups enjoyed support from less than one-third of the public. The groups enjoying the 
lowest levels of public trust and confidence were large corporations, insurers, and unions. 
Specifically, the least trusted groups in the survey were Wal-Mart, the AFL-CIO, the Service 
Employees International Union (“SEIU”), pharmaceutical companies, groups representing 
major corporations, health insurance companies, America’s Health Insurance Plans (“AHIP”), 
and the Chamber of Commerce.  
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Chart 2.1. Respondents Expressing a Great Deal or Fair Amount of Confidence in Health Care 
Stakeholders 
95% Confidence Intervals 
Providers and Non-Profit Groups 
For-Profit Groups 
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Chart 2.1 provides strong support for the commercial orientation hypothesis, which 
postulated that the public would exhibit higher levels of trust and confidence in groups 
representing professionals or non-profit organizations than their commercial counterparts. 
With the exception of two outliers – the Consumers Union and small businesses – provider 
groups and non-profit organizations enjoy uniformly higher levels of public support than 
commercial groups. These differences are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level. 
Chart 2.1 also provides insight into whether levels of public support for interest 
groups change when asked about a specific interest group versus a generic group. In the case 
of more prominent groups, the public appears to maintain similar levels of support for 
specific groups and their generic counterparts. For example, the AMA and AAP enjoy 
comparable levels of support to doctors groups. In the case of lesser-known groups, however, 
the public tends to express higher levels of confidence in the generic group. Whereas 40.6 
percent of the public expressed either a great deal or a fair amount of confidence in labor 
unions to recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care, only 25.6 
percent expressed similar levels of support for the SEIU.8 As subsequent tables will reveal, 
however, the equivalence of specific and generic groups only holds in the aggregate, if at all: 
patterns of support for specific groups and their generic counterparts vary a great deal across 
segments of the population. 
Consistent with the symbolic politics thesis, Table 2.2 reveals that partisanship 
influences public attitudes toward groups that have been politicized and have developed 
partisan affiliations. I hypothesized that the ANA, AFL-CIO, SEIU, and AARP would enjoy 
higher levels of support from Democrats than Republicans. By extension, I also expected the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8
 23.7 percent of the respondents in the survey indicated that they had either never heard of the SEIU or were 
not familiar with the group. In contrast, only 1.1 percent of all respondents were unfamiliar with labor unions. 
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same pattern to hold for nurses groups, labor unions, and groups representing senior citizens. 
Similarly, I expected the Chamber of Commerce, NFIB, and groups representing major 
corporations to enjoy more support from Republicans than Democrats. 
 
Democrats, at least politically aware Democrats, express higher levels of confidence 
than Republicans in the groups that were hypothesized to have Democratic leanings. The 
coefficient on the political awareness-party identification interaction term reveals that 
politically aware Democrats are significantly more likely than Republicans to express 
confidence in the ANA, AFL-CIO, SEIU, AARP, labor unions and seniors groups to 
recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care. By exponentiating 
the coefficient in the labor union model, for example, we can see that a politically aware 
Democrat is 1.51 times more likely than a Republican to have confidence in labor unions, 
ceteris paribus. Similarly, politically aware Democrats are 1.22 times more likely than 
Republicans to express confidence in the AARP. In fact, 72 percent of Democrats expressed a 
great deal or fair amount of confidence in the AARP to recommend the right thing for the 
Table 2.2. Partisanship Hypothesis: Public Attitudes Toward Key Interest Groups
ANA AFL-CIO SEIU AARP
Nurses 
Groups
Labor 
Unions
Seniors 
Groups
Chamber of 
Commerce
NFIB
Major 
Corporations
Age -0.14 0.32*** 0.05 -0.13 0.02 0.06 -0.10 0.13 -0.04 -0.02
Education 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.31*** 0.11 -0.03 .-06 0.15*
Income 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Male -0.49** 0.15 -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 0.22 0.17 0.02 0.22 0.16
Caucasian 0.00 0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.01**
Democrat 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Ideology -0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.24*** 0.22** 0.28*** 0.11 -0.08 -0.12 0.09
Health Status 0.18** -0.12 0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.20**
Uninsured -0.03 -0.15 0.28 0.18 0.33** 0.48** 0.85*** -0.10 -0.14 -0.10
Health Worker 0.61** 0.37***
Union Member 0.01 0.00 0.46 -0.03 -0.13** -0.33
Political Awareness 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.02 -0.11 -0.06 -0.177 -0.14 0.21* -0.01
Awareness * Party -0.21** -0.35*** -0.27*** -0.2* 0.04 -0.41*** -0.16* -0.19** -0.02 0.04
*Significant at p=0.10; **Significant at p=0.05; ***Significant at p=0.01.
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country when it comes to health care. By comparison, only 45 percent of Republicans 
expressed a similar level of support. These results tend to corroborate the partisanship 
hypothesis.  
Table 2.2 also illustrates how different segments of the public view several groups with 
Republican leanings. Contrary to expectations, Republicans do not exhibit higher levels of 
trust in these groups than Democrats. In fact, politically aware Democrats are actually 1.21 
times more likely than Republicans to have confidence in the Chamber of Commerce to 
recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care, despite the fact that 
this group contributes overwhelmingly to Republican candidates for federal office. Whatever 
patterns of support emerge for these business-oriented groups, it is clear that self-identified 
Republicans are not a statistically significant basis of support. In short, Table 2.2 corroborates 
the partisanship hypothesis when it comes to groups with Democratic leanings, but not when 
it comes to groups with Republican leanings.  
Several other interesting patterns of support also emerge in Table 2.2. First, the 
uninsured were significantly more likely to express confidence in nurses groups, labor unions 
and seniors groups to recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care 
than other segments of the public. In fact, exponentiating the logit coefficient in Table 2.2 
reveals that the uninsured are 2.34 times more likely than the rest of the public to express 
confidence in seniors groups, holding all other covariates at their means. Second, individuals 
who reported poorer health status expressed significantly less confidence in major 
corporations to recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care. 
Third, the politically aware have distinct views about the NFIB when compared to other 
members of the public. Specifically, the politically aware are 1.23 times more likely than others 
to have confidence in the NFIB to recommend the right thing for the country when it comes 
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to health care. This is notable because the NFIB is a relatively unknown group: 10.4 percent 
of respondents had either not heard of or were not familiar with the NFIB. Finally, racial 
minorities expressed distinct views about the SEIU, seniors groups and major corporations. 
Specifically, racial minorities expressed significantly higher levels of support for seniors groups 
and major corporations, and significantly lower levels of support for the SEIU. 
The study also yields interesting insights into the validity of the self-interest 
hypothesis, which postulated that individuals without institutional access to health care – 
those who are younger, have lower levels of education, report poorer health, or a lack of 
health insurance – will exhibit lower levels of trust in all sectors of the medico-industrial 
complex. As Table 2.3 reveals, the patterns of support that emerge are complex, and generally 
discredit the self-interest hypothesis in the realm of health care. 
 Age is not a significant determinant of public attitudes toward most groups in the 
health care sector. Contrary to the self-interest hypothesis, younger individuals actually display 
higher levels of trust in BCBS than older individuals. Exponentiating the coefficient on age in 
the model for BCBS reveals that younger individuals are 24.6 percent more likely to express 
trust in BCBS than older individuals. Interestingly, younger individuals are also significantly 
less likely to express trust in health insurers as a group. 
Table 2.3. Self-Interest Hypothesis: Public Attitudes Toward the Medico-Industrial Complex
AAP AMA ANA AHA
Doctors 
Groups
Nurses 
Groups
Hospitals AHIP BCBS
Health 
Insurers
Age 0.06 0.07 -0.11 0.10 -0.17 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.22** -0.21*
Education 0.21** 0.05 0.08 0.2** -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.14* 0.21** 0.26***
Income 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Male -0.36* -0.67*** -0.52*** -0.18 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.08 0.07 0.29
Caucasian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01**
Democrat 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ideology 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.22** 0.08 -0.2** -0.10 -0.16**
Health Status 0.07 0.15* 0.17** 0.09 0.04 -0.06 0.22** 0.16** 0.04 0.21**
Uninsured 0.14 -0.08 -0.01 -0.13 0.39* 0.35** 0.14 -0.54 -0.77** -0.09
Health Care Worker 0.15 0.42 0.56** 0.00 0.43** 0.38*** 0.06 0.33 0.32 0.32
*Significant at p=0.10; **Significant at p=0.05; ***Significant at p=0.01.
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 Table 2.3 also reveals that those with lower levels of education do not display less trust 
in the medico-industrial complex. On the contrary, those with more education are a 
particularly distrusting group, exhibiting significantly lower levels of trust in the AAP, AHA, 
AHIP, BCBS, and health insurers. Exponentiating the ordered logit coefficient in the table 
reveals, for example, that those with more education are 1.30 times more likely to express 
diminished confidence in health insurers than those with less education, ceteris paribus. The 
survey results indicate that 55.5 percent of college graduates express little or no confidence in 
BCBS to recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care. By 
comparison, only 43.7 percent of those with a high school education expressed such levels of 
distrust. 
 The attitudes of the uninsured are also complex, and fail to square neatly with the self-
interest hypothesis. Individuals who lacked health insurance at some time in the previous 12 
months actually expressed higher levels of confidence in doctors groups and nurses groups to 
recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care than those with 
health insurance. The uninsured are 1.48 times more likely than the insured to express a higher 
level of confidence in doctors groups, holding all other variables constant. Similarly, the 
uninsured are 1.42 times more likely than the insured to express a higher level of confidence in 
nurses groups. Interestingly, this pattern of support did not extend to specific named provider 
groups, such as the AAP, AMA, or ANA. 
Somewhat surprisingly, a lack of health insurance was not a significant determinant of 
attitudes toward AHIP or health insurers in general. However, the uninsured were 2.16 times 
more likely to express lower levels of trust in BCBS. Whereas 38.0 percent of those who 
lacked health insurance during the previous 12 months expressed a great deal or fair amount 
of confidence in BCBS to recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health 
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care, 45.5 percent of those with insurance expressed similar levels of support. This finding is 
particularly interesting, moreover, because those without insurance actually expressed 
heightened levels of support for doctors groups and nurses groups. Thus, the uninsured do 
not appear to harbor a widespread distrust of the health care industry.  
The lone area in which the results in Table 2.3 corroborate the self-interest hypothesis 
is the attitudes of those in poorer health. Consistent with expectations, the sick evince lower 
levels of confidence in myriad providers to recommend the right thing for the country when it 
comes to health care. Specifically, individuals in poorer health expressed lower levels of 
confidence in the AMA, ANA, and hospitals than other members of the public. Whereas 65.4 
percent of those in excellent or very good health expressed a great deal or fair amount of 
confidence in the AMA, for example, only 56.8 percent of those in fair or poor health 
expressed similar levels of support. The pattern was even more pronounced with respect to 
public attitudes toward hospitals: while only 8.6 percent of those in excellent or very good 
health expressed little or no confidence in hospitals, 46.5 percent of those in fair or poor 
health expressed little or no confidence in them.  
Individuals in poorer health also express lower levels of confidence in health insurance 
companies than healthier individuals. Whereas 34.4 percent of those in excellent health 
expressed a great deal or fair amount of confidence in health insurers to recommend the right 
thing for the country when it comes to health care, only 25.0 percent of those in poor health 
felt similarly. In short, it appears that those in poorer health express lower levels of confidence 
in all of the relevant points of contact with the medico-industrial complex, including insurers, 
providers, and hospitals. 
To test the robustness of the conclusion that the models do not generally support the 
self-interest hypothesis, each model was repeated with interaction terms for political 
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awareness and age, education, health status, and insurance status. These models assess 
whether politically aware respondents were better able to translate their perceived self-interest 
into meaningful political attitudes toward disparate health care interest groups and 
stakeholders. Consistent with the conclusion that these data do not generally support the self-
interest hypothesis, the results in Table 2.3 were not sensitive to the inclusion of the 
interaction terms, each of which failed to achieve statistical significance in every model.  
Two other interesting patterns emerge when examining Table 2.3, although neither is 
related to the self-interest hypothesis. First, income was an important and consistent 
determinant of support for several provider groups. Specifically, those with higher levels of 
income express consistently lower levels of trust and confidence in the AAP, AMA, and AHA 
to recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care. For example, 49.1 
percent of families earning $100,000 or more per year expressed little or no confidence in the 
AHA. In contrast, only 34.2 percent of families earning less than $50,000 per year expressed a 
similar level of dissatisfaction with the AHA. Moreover, it does not appear that the wealthy 
express greater levels of distrust across the board – the coefficient on income was only 
significant in the models for the three aforementioned provider groups and the SEIU.  
The second interesting pattern apparent in Table 2.3 is that women exhibit 
significantly higher levels of trust in the AAP, AMA and ANA than men. Holding all other 
variables constant, women are 1.43 times more likely than men to express confidence in the 
AAP, 1.95 times more likely to express confidence in the AMA, and 1.68 times more likely to 
express confidence in the ANA. In fact, these were the only three groups that obtained 
statistically significantly higher levels of support from either gender. In short, women tend to 
display higher levels of trust and confidence in health care providers than men. 
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 The results of this study also provide insight into the validity of the group-
identification hypothesis, which postulated that identification-based trust and egoistically-
based group interest will influence levels of trust in various groups. Referring back to Table 
2.2, it is apparent that the attitudes of unions members and the elderly do not substantiate the 
group-identification hypothesis. Union members do not express higher levels of support for 
labor unions than the general public, and the elderly are not more supportive of groups 
representing the elderly than others.  To confirm that these results are robust, the regression 
analyses were repeated using different specifications, including repeating the regressions with a 
dummy variable for the elderly. The relevant coefficients failed to achieve statistical 
significance in every specification. 
However, the results in Table 2.3 do provide qualified support for the group-
identification hypothesis. Consistent with expectations, health care workers exhibited higher 
levels of confidence in the ANA, doctors groups and nurses groups. In fact, health care 
workers are 1.75 times more likely to express confidence in the ANA than other members of 
the public, 1.54 times more likely to express confidence in doctors groups, and 1.46 times 
more likely to express confidence in nurses groups. However, employment as a health care 
worker was not a significant predictor of support for the other health care provider groups, 
including the AAP, AMA, AHA, and hospitals. 
Finally, the results of this study provide insight into whether levels of public support 
for interest groups change when asked about a specific interest group versus a generic group. 
In short, do names matter? This study investigated attitudes toward 11 stakeholders in the 
health care sector. As Table 2.4 reveals, attitudes were affected by the label used to describe 
five interest groups: small businesses, pharmaceutical companies, health insurers, consumer 
groups, and seniors groups.  
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 The coefficients on the generic label variable indicate that small businesses, consumer 
groups, and seniors groups were more popular than their named counterparts, the NFIB, 
Consumers Union, and AARP, respectively. For example, the survey results indicate that 61.3 
percent of the public expressed a great deal or fair amount of confidence in small businesses 
to recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care. In contrast, only 
39.6 percent expressed a similar level of trust in the NFIB. A t-test statistic for the difference 
in means reveals that these patterns do not depend on political awareness: public attitudes 
toward these groups were not significantly different among the politically aware and unaware. 
It is not the case that there was no effect among the politically aware. 
 Although several of the generic stakeholder groups were more popular than their 
named counterparts, this pattern did not hold for every group. As Table 2.4 reveals, heath 
insurers and pharmaceutical companies were both less popular than the specific interest 
groups that represent these industries. For the remaining stakeholders – doctors groups, 
nurses groups, major corporations, hospital groups, labor unions and patients groups – 
attitudes were unaffected by the label used to describe the stakeholder. Again, a t-test statistic 
Table 2.4. Group Name Hypothesis: Public Attitudes Toward Health Care Interests
Doctors 
Groups
Nurses 
Groups
Major 
Corporations
Small 
Businesses
Drug 
Companies
Health 
Insurers
Hospital 
Groups
Labor 
Unions
Consumers 
Groups
Seniors 
Groups
Patients 
Groups
Age -0.04 -0.04 0.12 -0.19** 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.24*** -0.02 -0.04 0.19**
Education 0.03 0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.14** 0.20*** 0.04 0.08 -0.04
Income 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Male -0.32** -0.30** 0.09 0.33** -0.02 0.19 -0.12 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12
Caucasian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Democrat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01*** 0.00
Ideology 0.03 0.13* 0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.12** 0.06 0.21** 0.17** 0.18** 0.07
Health Status 0.09 0.07 0.116* 0.13* -0.01 0.10 0.16** -0.14** -0.02 0.00 -0.03
Uninsured 0.15 0.16 -0.13 -0.05 -0.03 -0.37 0.00 0.17 0.06 0.53*** 0.05
Health Care Worker 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.06
Union Member -0.14 -0.10 0.05
Generic Label -0.07 -0.16 0.02 -0.62*** 0.26* 0.56*** -0.10 0.04 -0.28** -0.49*** 0.04
*Significant at p=0.10; **Significant at p=0.05; ***Significant at p=0.01.
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for the difference in means reveals that these patterns do not depend on political awareness: 
public attitudes toward these groups were not significantly different among the politically 
aware and unaware. 
Discussion 
In a political landscape that is increasingly characterized by prodigious advertising 
expenditures, it is important to understand which interest groups and stakeholders in the 
health care landscape possess the necessary credibility to engage in issue framing, shape public 
perceptions, and communicate political information to voters. The importance of how the 
public perceives the interest groups in the health care sector is magnified, moreover, because 
the Supreme Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Every time that an 
interest group attempts to persuade the electorate or shape the contours of debate through a 
political advertisement, the public will be able to discern which group or coalition sponsored 
the message. 
As this study reveals, the myriad interests in the health care arena enjoy widely 
disparate levels of public support. Health care professionals and non-profit organizations 
enjoy substantially higher levels of trust than the for-profit interests in the health care sector. 
Groups such as the AMA, AAP, ANA, and ACS enjoy sufficiently high levels of public 
support to credibly disseminate their message to the public. In contrast, groups like the 
Chamber of Commerce, PhRMA, AHIP, the AFL-CIO, and SEIU enjoy such low levels of 
trust that they cannot effectively communicate their messages to the public directly. One of 
the key takeaways from this study is the singular importance of coalition politics in the health 
care sector. If the for-profit groups in the health care sector hope to shape public perceptions 
as the implementation battles surrounding the Affordable Care Act begin, they will be 
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required to leverage the existing bastions of trust in the industry by creating coalitions with 
provider groups and non-profit interests. 
The opportunity for coalition politics in the health care arena is amplified by the fact 
that names can and do matter. Attitudes and bases of support change when the public is asked 
about the AHA as opposed to hospital groups, for example, or the NFIB instead of small 
businesses. Moreover, names can affect the attitudes of both the politically aware and the 
politically unaware alike. Consequently, coalitions sponsoring political advertisements may be 
able to circumvent or mitigate credibility problems by adopting a name that instills more trust. 
While this conclusion may be old hand in the world of coalition politics or political 
communication, this study reveals some of the limits on how much credence the public will 
give to a name. Disseminating a message under the aegis of a hypothetical Coalition To 
Protect America’s Seniors may garner higher levels of trust among the politically unaware, but 
the politically attentive simply do not put much stock in a name when it comes to groups 
representing seniors. 
Understanding public attitudes toward key players in the health care arena is also a 
valuable tool for policymakers. To cite just one example, a recent analysis of national opinion 
polls reveals that a majority of Americans support increased federal spending on public health, 
though many do not favor increased spending in areas that public health officials deem 
essential (Blendon et. al 2010). In order to sustain public support for increased public health 
spending, therefore, government officials will be required to give examples of cost savings 
emanating from public health programs (Blendon et. al 2010). To do so, it would be extremely 
useful for government officials to know which messengers can credibly deliver such a message 
to key segments of the voting public. If women are a key demographic group, for example, 
then it would be sensible to leverage the AAP, AMA or ANA to deliver the message. Those 
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targeting younger voters, on the other hand, would be wise to create a coalition with BCBS or 
the AFL-CIO because young people express higher levels of confidence in these groups to 
recommend the right thing for the country when it comes to health care. 
This study also provides useful insights into the political attitudes of the uninsured. As 
Douglas Arnold (1990) observed in his classic study of congressional action, legislators can 
generally ignore the perspective of groups that are beleaguered by collective action problems. 
At present, the uninsured are the prototypical group suffering from a collective action 
problem. However, an “instigator” can change legislators’ voting calculus by revealing citizens’ 
stakes in political outcomes and affecting the probability that an individual will notice a 
particular cost or benefit (Arnold 1990, 30). With the constitutionality and fate of the 
individual mandate unclear at this time, it is worthwhile to consider how an instigator could 
credibly reach and mobilize the uninsured in future health policy debates. The results of this 
study provide useful and unexpected results: contrary to the institutional access hypothesis, 
the uninsured actually expressed higher levels of confidence in doctors groups and nurses 
groups than those with insurance. Thus, a political activist, legislator or instigator would be 
wise to leverage these bastions of trust. However, doctors groups and nurses groups are more 
trusted than their named counterparts – thus, it would be wise to leverage individual health 
care providers as opposed to the AMA or ANA. 
While it is important to understand which groups the public perceives to be credible 
and trustworthy, it is also important to understand why. Symbolic politics and self-interest 
have both been hypothesized to influence political attitudes and preferences. In the realm of 
health care, neither hypothesis appears to predominate. For example, symbolic politics and 
partisanship fail to explain public attitudes toward groups that are traditionally aligned with the 
Republican party.  Similarly, self-interest fails to explain attitudes toward the medico-industrial 
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complex.9 However, both hypotheses do appear to retain important, if somewhat 
circumscribed, explanatory power. Partisanship is a significant predictor of support for groups 
with Democratic leanings. Self-interest may be a powerful explanation for why those in poorer 
health express distrust for virtually every sector of the medico-industrial complex: providers, 
hospitals, insurers and large corporations. While it is impossible to posit concrete causal 
explanations from the results of this study, the findings certainly have implications for the 
plausibility of the symbolic politics and self-interest hypotheses in the health care arena. 
Although this study yields important insights into public attitudes toward stakeholders 
in the health care arena, the findings have an important limitation. It is difficult to extrapolate 
the public sentiments expressed herein to dramatically different contexts because this study 
employs cross-sectional survey data. In short, this study offers a snapshot of public attitudes 
toward key interests and stakeholders in the health care industry at the pinnacle of the health 
care reform debate under President Obama. It seems unlikely that public sentiments are 
completely static. Instead, they are likely to fluctuate with the sociopolitical environment and 
constellation of interest groups mobilized during a particular debate. 
Conclusion 
A substantial body of evidence from experiments, surveys and political campaigns 
suggests that public opinion frequently depends on how elites frame a particular issue 
(Druckman 2001). Some estimates suggest that more than $200 million was spent on political 
advertising during the health care reform debate under President Obama (Alonso-Zaldivar 
2010), and influential groups are also beginning to use paid advertising to shape the major 
implementation battles surrounding the Affordable Care Act (Sparer 2010). Consequently, it is 
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 Although this finding may be an artifact of how self-interest has been operationalized in this study, it is clear 
that individuals who are younger, less educated and without health insurance do not exhibit lower levels of trust 
in health care providers and institutions. 
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important for policymakers, politicians and scholars alike to understand public attitudes 
toward the various groups and stakeholders in the health care arena. Hopefully this study 
yields useful insights into some of the processes that undergird public opinion formation in 
contemporary health policy debates. 
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Chapter 3. Media Regulation and Viewpoint Diversity in Health Policy Debates 
Since its inception, commercial broadcasting has been heralded as a mechanism to 
foster the broad democratic goals of deliberation, accountability and an informed citizenry. In 
the Communications Act of 1934, Congress charged the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) with the duty to regulate broadcasting in the furtherance of “the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity.”10 To that end, Congress and the FCC developed a 
regulatory regime that appealed to a communitarian and instrumentalist understanding of the 
First Amendment and valued public deliberation as the pinnacle of democratic engagement.11 
Early regulations promulgated by the FCC set rules for the presentation of controversial issues 
of public importance in an effort to promote viewpoints that might otherwise be excluded 
from public debate.12 The FCC’s overarching regulatory objective was to “meet certain basic 
needs of American politics and culture, over and above what the marketplace may or may not 
provide,” in order to “cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic dialogue, 
diversity of expression, a more educated population, and more robust, culturally inclusive 
communities.”13  
Despite early optimism about the potential for broadcasting to promote a healthy, 
functioning democracy, commentators have frequently decried that private broadcasting has 
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 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 312(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1087 (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (2000)). 
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 Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of 
Digital Markets, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1389, 1394-95 (2004). 
 
"#!Report on!Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1258 (1949)(requiring that “programs be 
designed so that the public has a reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing positions on the public issues 
of interest and importance in the community”). 
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 Charting the Digital Broadcasting Future: Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Public Interest 
Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters 21 (1998); see also Victoria F. Phillips, On Media Consolidation, 
the Public Interest, and Angels Earning Wings, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 613, 619 (2004) (noting that the broadcast 
public interest standard “has been used to serve the needs of American citizens and to cultivate many localized 
public forums with diverse viewpoints facilitating citizen participation in our democracy”). 
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failed to “realize the vast potentialities” of the medium.14 Moreover, there is a general 
consensus that traditional approaches to media regulation have not fully effectuated the early 
aspirations of the broadcast medium.15 In this article, I evaluate several competing policy 
options designed to promote viewpoint diversity in extant political debates and improve 
political discourse. In addition, I also propose a novel regulatory approach that is consciously 
designed to improve viewpoint diversity in political debates. Specifically, I propose a 
“marketplace of ideas tax” that would be levied on all political advertisements to endow a 
“marketplace of ideas trust fund,” which would then be used to subsidize speech from 
underrepresented viewpoints. This approach leverages insights garnered from models of 
political learning and social science research concerning the role of political advertisements in 
contemporary policy debates. In short, this article seeks to reinvigorate the agenda for 
regulating to promote viewpoint diversity in political debates.  
Background 
The Content of Commercial Broadcasting 
Numerous commentators have lamented that commercial broadcasting has failed to 
“realize the vast potentialities” of the medium.16 Indeed, it would be difficult to contend that 
broadcasting has cultivated a more informed citizenry, more inclusive democratic dialogue, 
and improved diversity of expression. On the contrary, modern public opinion research 
reveals that the general public is politically uninformed17 and inattentive.18 While commercial 
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 NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943). 
 
"$!See, e.g.,!Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 5-7 (2009). 
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 See, e.g., Steven Chafee and Stacey Frank, How Americans Get Political Information: Print Versus Broadcast 
News, 546 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sct. 48, 49 (1996). 
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broadcasting is not solely responsible for the dire portrait of the American electorate, two 
factors suggest that it plays a central role in the problem. First, the average American watches 
over 5 hours of television per day,19 and television remains the primary source of news20 and 
political information for most Americans.21 Despite the increasing abundance of political 
information available via new media, the majority of broadcast news viewers do not seek out 
alternative sources of information.22 Thus, commercial broadcasting certainly has the potential 
to foster democratic deliberation and contribute to voter knowledge. Second, the content of 
commercial broadcast programming is often inadequate to promote the democratic ideals of 
deliberation, accountability and an informed citizenry. In an effort to attract the largest 
audience possible, media conglomerates design programming that is aimed at the lowest 
common denominator.23 Consequently, the political information environment has 
deteriorated, and the amount of policy-oriented information in news coverage has declined.24 
The lack of news coverage of substantive political issues has contributed to the existence of a 
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 See, e.g., Markus Prior, Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in Political 
Involvement and Polarizes Elections 151 (2007)(“As a result of greater media choice, fewer Americans watch the 
news and learn about politics than in the past.”). 
 
19
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largely politically uninformed public.25 Moreover, due to the antipathy of corporate media to 
unpopular and unorthodox ideas,26 commercial broadcasting tends to preserve and promote 
the status quo by airing content that is aimed at “reinforcing people’s existing attitudes [rather 
than] changing them.”27 
Inequalities in Political Voice 
To fill the void left by commercial broadcasting, political candidates and issue 
advocates have increasingly financed political advertising campaigns in an effort to reach and 
inform the public.28 While political advertisements can contribute to political learning by 
exposing otherwise inattentive individuals to political information,29 their increasing 
predominance as a medium of communication is not an unmitigated good. Due to their 
expense, political advertisements are a form of political voice that is available to only a small 
minority of all interests and groups.30 This “inequality in the power to communicate ideas”31 
may be particularly problematic, moreover, because advertising campaigns are a very potent 
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mode of political speech. Political advertisements can affect the tenor and framing of media 
coverage of policy debates,32 which is extremely important to both public opinion formation33 
and the outcome of these debates. Specifically, the standards, terms, perspectives, metaphors 
and visual images used by the media – in short, how an issue is framed in the news – can 
“promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation.”34 Indeed, issue frames “determine what the public thinks it is 
becoming informed about, which in turn often determines how people take sides on political 
issues.”35 Thus, the public may unconsciously internalize political messages that are 
disseminated primarily by moneyed interests and groups, undermining the democratic goals of 
deliberation and accountability.  
The inequality in access to political voice is exacerbated by the propensity of courts to 
“treat the free speech rights of private actors as fungible with no regard to differentials in 
communicating power.”36 As Professor Jerome Barron has observed,37 the Supreme Court 
espoused this perspective in the 1976 campaign finance case of Buckley v. Valeo.38 In Buckley, 
the Court endorsed the idea that the First Amendment protects the free speech rights of each 
individual equally, but dismissed the argument that limitations on expenditures are justifiable 
because differentials in financial resources can influence the outcome of elections: “the 
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concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”39 In short, the 
Court will protect speech once it comes to the fore, but it is indifferent to creating 
opportunities for expression.40 
John Rawls warned that “[t]he liberties protected by the principle of participation lose 
much of their value whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to use their 
advantage to control the course of public debate.”41 Indeed, this concern seems to be 
particularly relevant and consequential in our modern political discourse. During the Clinton 
health care reform debate in 1993 and 1994, for example, 650 interest groups and 
organizations spent in excess of $100 million to influence the policy debate and its outcome.42 
In a survey of members of the House and Senate, interest group advertising was cited as the 
most significant influence on the outcome of the reform debate.43 More recently, over $200 
million was spent on political advertising during the health care reform debate under President 
Obama.44 If our First Amendment jurisprudence and democratic aspirations counsel a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,45 the foregoing discussion should be cause for concern. 
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A Functioning Marketplace of Ideas 
In order to formulate a coherent approach to media regulation, it is first necessary to 
imagine what the ideal broadcast marketplace of ideas would look like. It is possible to 
articulate at least two divergent visions of the ideal marketplace of ideas: a consumer 
sovereignty ideal and a civic republican ideal. The former ideal trumpets the virtues of 
consumer sovereignty and emphasizes the reactive media policy goal of satisfying existing 
consumer demand.46 The latter ideal suggests that broadcast policy should strive to cultivate 
public tastes, build social solidarity and improve democratic debate.47 This ideal requires that 
broadcast policy be both proactive and reactive. 
The deregulatory agenda that has dominated media regulation since the 1980s 
represents the triumph of the consumer sovereignty ideal and laissez-faire principles. For 
nearly the past three decades, media regulation has frequently been viewed as either inefficient 
or unnecessary because the market was thought to be sufficiently competitive to satisfy 
consumer demands.48 However, two salient critiques of the consumer sovereignty ideal 
warrant consideration. On an empirical level, it is not clear that the laissez-faire broadcast 
marketplace actually satisfies consumer demands. For example, there is evidence that 
broadcasters may undervalue viewers’ desire for substantive political news and diverse political 
programming.49 On a normative level, it seems problematic to label the broadcast marketplace 
a success even if it does satisfy existing consumer preferences. First, there is evidence that 
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consumer preferences may be endogenous to market dynamics: commercial markets may 
generate and manipulate public preferences rather than ascertain and satisfy them.50 
Consequently, it would be circular to label the broadcast marketplace a success if it merely 
satisfied the consumer preferences that it generated in the first place. Second, there is evidence 
that the laissez-faire broadcast marketplace actually contributes to the deterioration of the 
political information environment51 and the homogenization of political debate within 
mainstream parameters.52 To anyone who once heralded the potential of commercial 
broadcasting to foster the democratic goals of deliberation, accountability, and an informed 
citizenry, the consumer sovereignty ideal seems a woefully unsatisfying objective. 
If the civic republican vision of the marketplace of ideas – and its attendant 
commitment to proactive media policy – is used as a point of departure, it is still essential to 
identify the precise goals that media policy should strive to accomplish. What would a 
functioning marketplace of ideas look like? In this article, I endorse Jürgen Habermas' 
depiction of the public sphere53 as a model for the ideal broadcast marketplace of ideas. In this 
model, different viewpoints would jostle for public consumption in the broadcast marketplace 
on the basis of their public appeal.54 At the same time, however, the broadcast marketplace 
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would also be aspirational, cultivating shared norms and exposing citizens to ideas that they 
might not otherwise seek.55 In short, the ideal broadcast marketplace of ideas would serve as a 
forum for intellectual exchange that satisfies an existing diversity of tastes, fosters more robust 
and inclusive democratic dialogue, and helps produce a more informed citizenry. 
The Objectives of media Regulation 
How can media policy better realize the vast potentialities of the broadcast medium 
and the aspirational vision of the marketplace of ideas? This article starts from the premise 
that the central goal of media policy should be to improve viewpoint diversity in extant 
political debates. The FCC defines viewpoint diversity as the “availability of media content 
reflecting a variety of perspectives.”56 In a world in which political debate is homogenized 
within mainstream parameters,57 broadcasters eschew coverage of controversial issues,58 and 
moneyed interests expend millions of dollars trying to define the contours of public debates,59 
media policy should consciously promote diverse and underrepresented viewpoints in an 
effort to improve the political information environment. Whereas the homogenization of 
political debate necessarily simplifies issues and blunts discussion, promoting viewpoint 
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diversity enriches debate, permits meaningful deliberation, and produces a more informed 
citizenry. Trying to enable diverse and discordant viewpoints to achieve a toehold in 
contemporary debates implicitly endorses the counterspeech principle, which promotes 
additional speech as the prescribed solution when forms of expression carry detrimental 
effects for democracy: “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence.”60 In short, promoting diverse and underrepresented viewpoints 
may be a necessary antidote to the influence of money in broadcasting and politics today.  
 Targeting viewpoint diversity as the focal point of media policy has its drawbacks, 
however. First, some critics have argued that leveraging the counterspeech principle to 
improve democratic discourse is inapposite in an age of abundant media speech. Studies show 
that the public has a limited attention span for speech on political and social issues,61 and 
flooding individuals with more speech may counterproductively dull their senses and diminish 
their ability to discern quality or truth in political debates.62 Consequently, simply adding 
underrepresented viewpoints to the panoply of voices in a debate may not effectively enrich 
public discourse.63 Second, if individuals still obtain news from a single source – Fox News, 
for example – then promoting additional viewpoints on PBS will not expose citizens to new 
ideas or diverse perspectives. In short, efforts to promote viewpoint diversity in political 
debates must be able to overcome obstacles such as attention spectrum scarcity and audience 
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fragmentation if they are to improve the political information environment and contribute to 
political learning. 
The idea that government has an affirmative obligation to facilitate opportunities for 
speech has a long and celebrated history. The framers of the Constitution, for example, 
advocated government subsidization of journalism and the democratization of “political 
intelligence and information.”64 Zachariah Chafee, Jr. similarly argued that “affirmative action 
by the government” is necessary to ensure that the marketplace of ideas functions properly.65 
The Supreme Court evinced this understanding of the First Amendment in Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, stating that “it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve 
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to 
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a 
private licensee.”66 Indeed, when critics of media regulation disparage the government’s 
capacity to regulate in the public interest, they enable nongovernmental constraints on 
democratic discourse to operate unchecked.67 However, government has the unique potential 
to act as a “countervailing power” to promote the public interest against the tide of market 
forces.68 In that vein, Cass Sunstein has argued that there is an affirmative government 
obligation to provide opportunities and subsidies for speech.69 
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This article will proceed as follows. I evaluate several policy alternatives designed to 
improve political discourse and promote viewpoint diversity in extant political debates. I then 
describe and examine my proposed marketplace of ideas trust fund. Next, I assess the 
constitutionality of the proposed regulation.  
Alternative Approaches to Improving Viewpoint Diversity in Political Debates 
 If the central goal of media policy is to improve viewpoint diversity in extant political 
debates, any program designed to achieve this end should be judged – somewhat tautologically 
– by whether it effectively disseminates a diverse range of viewpoints. This overarching 
criterion can be meaningfully disaggregated into two distinct subparts based on the discussion 
above. First, does the program promote a diverse spectrum of viewpoints? Recall the 
argument that media conglomerates eschew unpopular and unorthodox ideas due to their 
desire to attract and retain the largest commercial audience possible.70 Consequently, a media 
policy that relies of the laissez-faire marketplace to promote viewpoint diversity might 
generate a very limited spectrum of viewpoints. Second, does the program enable a diverse 
range of viewpoints to actually reach the public? There is an old adage that a message 
delivered is not necessarily a message received. Obstacles such as attention spectrum scarcity, 
audience fragmentation or regulatory unenforceability can undermine an ostensibly 
worthwhile program. Using these criteria, I will evaluate competing policy options designed to 
promote viewpoint diversity and improve the quality of political debates. 
Substantive Media Regulation: The Fairness Doctrine 
In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress charged the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) with the duty to regulate broadcasting in the furtherance of “the public 
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interest, convenience, and necessity.”71 The Supreme Court characterized these terms as a 
delegation of “expansive powers” by means of a “comprehensive mandate” to make the best 
use of the public airwaves.72 This mandate came to be known as the broadcast public interest 
standard. The FCC embraced this comprehensive mandate in its early years, stating in 1949 
that the goal of broadcast regulation “is the development of an informed public opinion 
through the public dissemination of news and ideas concerning the vital public issues of the 
day.”73 To that end, the FCC of the 1940s and 1950s promulgated substantive media 
regulations – legal guidelines about the substance of broadcast programming – to democratize 
information and facilitate the exchange of ideas in a competitive broadcast marketplace of 
ideas.74 The FCC’s most prominent initiative was the promulgation of the fairness doctrine, 
which required broadcasters to devote a reasonable percentage of airtime to covering 
controversial issues of public importance and to provide a reasonable opportunity for the 
expression of opposing views on those issues.75 Thus, the fairness doctrine consciously tried 
to promote viewpoint diversity by giving voice to viewpoints that might otherwise be 
excluded from public debate.  
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 The FCC did not formally abolish the fairness doctrine until 1987.76 When it did, the 
agency observed that the doctrine chilled coverage of controversial issues of public 
importance because broadcasters did not want to trigger the doctrine’s balancing 
requirements.77 Indeed, despite the fairness doctrine’s longevity, commentators have observed 
that this era of substantive media regulation failed to promote a competitive broadcast 
marketplace of ideas.78 Its checkered history notwithstanding, numerous politicians and 
pundits have called for the renewed application of the fairness doctrine as a way to improve 
the quality of contemporary political discourse.79 To understand why substantive media 
regulation failed to improve viewpoint diversity in the broadcast marketplace, and would likely 
fail to do so if promulgated and enforced anew today, it will be useful to consider the criteria 
enumerated at the beginning of this section. 
As a threshold matter, the fairness doctrine is unlikely to promote a diverse spectrum 
of viewpoints because it is exceedingly vague.80 Consider, for example, the myriad conceptual 
and definitional ambiguities that beleaguer this approach. What constitutes a controversial 
issue of public importance? When has a broadcaster raised such an issue? When has a 
broadcaster afforded a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of opposing viewpoints on 
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the issue?81 Most importantly, given that important public issues are complex and 
multidimensional, which competing viewpoints must be presented?82 If a broadcast licensee 
aired content suggesting that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will dramatically 
increase health insurance premiums, for example, is the relevant opposing viewpoint that it 
will not? What about an argument that insurance premiums should be a secondary or tertiary 
consideration, and that the real issue is federalism? Social justice? Pharmaceutical research and 
development incentives? Perhaps more than any other feature, the fairness doctrine’s two-
dimensional preoccupation with “opposing viewpoints” precludes it from ever promoting a 
truly diverse spectrum of perspectives on complex and controversial issues of public 
importance.  
The significance of these conceptual ambiguities is exacerbated by the fact that the 
fairness doctrine vests the locus of responsibility with the broadcast licensees themselves.83 
Specifically, the doctrine charges each broadcast licensee with the duty to provide a reasonable 
opportunity for the expression of opposing views on controversial issues of public 
importance.84 Moreover, the doctrine operates reactively, requiring some action or willful 
inaction by a broadcaster to trigger liability.85 Hopefully the preceding discussion makes clear, 
however, that broadcast licensees are the wrong gatekeepers to promote civic republican 
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ideals. To appreciate why broadcasters should not be entrusted with the task of determining 
which competing viewpoints should be presented in contemporary public debates, one need 
only consider the disparate incentives facing broadcasters and the FCC: viewers and 
advertisers are the commodities that are traded on the commercial broadcast airwaves, not 
public interest programming.86 Consequently, broadcast licensees have an incentive to design 
programming that appeals to mainstream tastes and attitudes87 rather than foster viewpoint 
diversity and cultivate communitarian ideals.88 In short, the fairness doctrine is a suboptimal 
way to disseminate a diverse spectrum of viewpoints because it is too vague, vests 
responsibility with the wrong parties, and operates reactively.  
 The same features that preclude the fairness doctrine from promoting a diverse range 
of viewpoints also preclude it from ensuring that a diverse range of viewpoints actually 
reaches the public. Due in part to the conceptual and definitional ambiguities that plague the 
fairness doctrine, for example, the FCC developed a lax enforcement regime in which it rarely 
required broadcasters to cover issues of public importance.89 Moreover, the powerful 
broadcasting lobby vehemently opposed the fairness doctrine, asserting that the programming 
requirements were too cumbersome and abridged their First Amendment rights.90 In response, 
the FCC generally ignored the programming requirements and rarely referred to them in 
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subsequent enforcement and rulemaking proceedings.91 In 1950, for example, one station 
received a license renewal despite the station management’s express refusal to air any public 
interest programming required by the FCC.92 As a result, broadcasters sidestepped the 
requirement that they present diverse viewpoints on issues of public importance by not 
covering the issues in the first place.93 In short, the fairness doctrine simultaneously chilled 
discussion of controversial public issues and failed to improve viewpoint diversity in the 
marketplace of ideas.94  
 The fairness doctrine is the archetypal regulation that failed to deliver on its promise. 
The approach is ostensibly promising because it consciously attempts to promote viewpoint 
diversity by giving a platform to viewpoints that might otherwise be excluded from public 
debate. The mechanisms that the doctrine leverages to do so, however, are inefficient: the 
regulation is malleable and ambiguous and it entrusts broadcast licensees with the task of 
disseminating diverse viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance. As a result, the 
fairness doctrine failed to promote a diverse spectrum of viewpoints and failed to ensure that 
a diverse spectrum of viewpoints actually reached the public. 
The Laissez-Faire Approach: An Unfettered Marketplace of Ideas 
Although the FCC did not formally abolish the fairness doctrine until 1987, the 
regulatory paradigm at the FCC began to change in the 1970s. In the wake of the Vietnam 
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War, the Pentagon Papers controversy, Watergate, and President Nixon’s efforts to penalize 
broadcasters that aired programming critical of his Administration, the public became 
increasingly skeptical of government’s ability to promote the pubic interest through 
regulation.95 In 1982, FCC Chairman Mark Fowler proposed that governmental oversight of 
broadcasting should jettison substantive media regulations and instead rely on “broadcasters' 
ability to determine the wants of their audiences through the normal mechanisms of the 
marketplace.”96 This approach was premised on rational-choice theories and Chicago School 
models of competition, which proffered that an unregulated telecommunications market 
would ascertain and respond most effectively to the public’s desire for public affairs 
information and debate.97 Furthermore, unfettered discussion would best promote the 
discovery of truth by keeping the marketplace of ideas free from government intrusion.98 
Adhering to this logic, the FCC subsequently eliminated many radio programming guidelines, 
community programming requirements, and public affairs programming requirements.99  
As I suggested earlier, the laissez-faire approach to broadcast regulation is a 
suboptimal way to promote a diverse spectrum of viewpoints. The foundational assumption 
of the deregulatory approach to broadcasting is that the marketplace of ideas is readily 
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accessible to proponents of diverse viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance.100 
This proposition is highly suspect, however, and the analogy between the marketplace of ideas 
and laissez-faire economic markets has been criticized as inapposite.101 Indeed, the unregulated 
broadcast marketplace is not equally accessible to all viewpoints because commercial market 
forces are not prepolitical or ideologically neutral.102 Broadcasting is a commercial enterprise, 
and market forces are not hospitable to public affairs programming because these programs 
attract smaller audiences and generate less profit than other programming alternatives.103 
Moreover, media conglomerates are averse to unpopular and unorthodox ideas due to their 
desire to attract and retain the largest commercial audience possible.104 If Justice Holmes was 
correct when he observed that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market,”105 then the unregulated broadcast marketplace will 
necessarily fail to promote truth or a diverse spectrum of viewpoints because not every 
viewpoint has an equal chance ex ante to compete and prevail in the market. 
The laissez-faire broadcast marketplace similarly precludes a diverse range of 
viewpoints from actually reaching the public because not all speakers enjoy equal access to the 
marketplace. In lieu of equality of access to the marketplace of ideas, “those with extensive 
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institutional or financial resources” have greater access to “effective mass communication.”106 
Indeed, high barriers to entry in the telecommunications market, monopolies on the medium 
of transmission, high costs of production, and wealth disparities among citizens all “impede 
access to mass audiences and skew public discussion in favor of the interests of those who 
possess power and wealth in an open society.”107 This inequality in access to the marketplace 
of ideas thus performs a mainstreaming function by constraining viewpoint diversity within 
the confines of established parameters.108 In short, the deregulatory approach to the 
marketplace of ideas allows nongovernmental constraints on public discourse to operate 
unchecked.109  
Candidate-Centered Approaches: Vouchers and Free Airtime 
 More recent attempts to improve viewpoint diversity in political debates have tended 
to focus on providing free access to broadcasting for qualifying political candidates. In 2002 
and 2003, for example, Senators John McCain, Russ Feingold, and Richard Durbin sponsored 
the Political Campaign Broadcast Activity Improvements Act and the Our Democracy, Our 
Airwaves Act.110 These bills would have required broadcast licensees to air at least two hours 
of candidate-centered or issue-centered programming per week leading up to elections,111 and 
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would have provided qualifying political candidates with broadcast vouchers to be used for 
political advertisements on television and radio.112 Candidates would have qualified for the 
vouchers after achieving a predetermined fundraising target, and the vouchers would have 
been funded by a spectrum use fee levied on no more than one percent of the gross annual 
revenues of broadcast license holders.113 While the programming requirements were a familiar 
form of substantive media regulation designed to improve the public affairs content of 
broadcasting, the voucher systems were designed to provide all political candidates with access 
to advertising, thereby increasing political speech and diversity of expression.114  
 These proposals predictably encountered stiff opposition from the broadcasting 
industry. Critics argued that the bills interfered with the editorial discretion of broadcasters by 
dictating the programming content and format required during the public affairs broadcasts.115 
They also argued that the free airtime requirement and spectrum use fee constituted a tax on 
broadcasters.116 Although both bills failed to become law, Senators Richard Durbin, Arlen 
Specter, Russ Feingold and Barack Obama introduced similar legislation in 2007.117 The Fair 
Elections Now Act eliminated the candidate-centered and issue-centered programming 
requirements included in the previous bills, but retained the broadcast voucher proposal.118 To 
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be eligible for a voluntary system of public financing, each Senate candidate was first required 
to raise qualifying contributions of $2,000 plus $500 for each congressional district in his 
state.119 Qualifying contributions were defined as contributions from individual donors that 
did not exceed five dollars. Once a candidate demonstrated his viability, he was eligible to 
receive broadcast vouchers in the amount of $100,000 multiplied by the number of 
congressional districts in his state.120 The vouchers would have been funded through a 
spectrum use fee equal to two percent of broadcasters’ gross annual revenues, providing 
roughly $1.3 billion in vouchers.121 
 From the perspective of promoting viewpoint diversity, the key criticism of voucher 
and/or free airtime proposals is that they will inevitably fail to promote a diverse spectrum of 
viewpoints because they entrust politicians with the task of improving the diversity of 
expression in political debates. Indeed, I contend that any candidate-centered approach to 
promoting viewpoint diversity is doomed to failure due to the incentives and constraints 
facing political candidates. Rational choice theorists posit that politicians are primarily 
interested in winning election and reelection.122 Some scholars suggest that this office-seeking 
behavior leads politicians to “choose policy positions and utter policy-related statements with 
an eye to voter preferences and the likely aggregate of voter choices.”123 Others suggest that 
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“politicians prefer to be sure that if they act they will not find themselves out on a limb,”124and 
that they become “addicted to equivocation and ambiguity” due to the unpredictability of how 
the electorate will respond to public statements on salient issues.125 Whatever perspective one 
ascribes to, it seems clear that relying on candidates for public office to promote diverse 
viewpoints will necessarily be suboptimal: these actors will be susceptible to a mainstreaming 
effect because voicing unpopular ideas and promoting minority viewpoints is unlikely to lead 
to electoral success.  
Candidate-centered approaches to promoting viewpoint diversity also appear unlikely 
to enable a diverse range of viewpoints to actually reach the public. Specifically, providing free 
airtime or broadcasting vouchers to political candidates will not enable diverse viewpoints to 
reach the public because these proposals inevitably face a tension between rationing a scarce 
resource and encouraging a multiplicity of voices. The Fair Elections Now Act, for example, 
required each Senate candidates to raise qualifying contributions of $2,000 plus $500 for each 
congressional district in his state to be eligible for the advertising vouchers. This provision was 
a rationing mechanism designed to ensure that only viable political candidates were eligible for 
a limited pool of voucher money. As a consequence, however, a Senate candidate would be 
required to obtain contributions from between 500 (Alaska) and 5,700 (California) different 
donors to be eligible for the public financing system. It seems unlikely that candidates outside 
of the established two-party system will regularly be able to surmount that hurdle. While these 
proposals may introduce more speech from Democrats and Republicans, they are not likely to 
promote a real multiplicity of voices that will espouse underrepresented viewpoints. If we are 
taking viewpoint diversity seriously, it seems impolitic to vest candidates for public office with 
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the responsibility of disseminating diverse viewpoints to the public and improving democratic 
discourse. 
The Marketplace of Ideas Trust Fund 
Issue advertisements have been unexamined in previous debates about how to 
promote viewpoint diversity and democratic deliberation through media regulation. Previous 
discourse has generally focused on substantive media regulation (i.e., legal guidelines about the 
substance of programming)126 or structural regulation of media ownership (e.g., rules limiting 
the aggregate television audience that any single entity may reach).127 In contrast, the 
marketplace of ideas trust fund leverages insights garnered from models of political learning 
and research concerning the role of political advertisements in contemporary policy debates to 
promote viewpoints that might otherwise be excluded from public debate. Under this 
approach, a “marketplace of ideas tax” would be levied on all political advertisements to 
endow a “marketplace of ideas trust fund,” which would then be used to subsidize political 
advertisements sponsored by underrepresented viewpoints.  
Admittedly, the proposed marketplace of ideas regulation is imperfect. At times, it can 
be criticized as either too incipient or too vague. Nonetheless, the problems that plague our 
democratic discourse are very real, and have been largely resistant to previous policy 
prescriptions. Thus, my hope is that the marketplace of ideas regulation will revive discussion 
and creative thinking about how to regulate to improve viewpoint diversity in extant political 
debates. Even incrementally improving the diversity and multiplicity of voices in 
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contemporary debates should strengthen the political information environment and foster the 
broad democratic goals of deliberation, accountability and a more informed citizenry.  
In this portion of the chapter, I first discuss the empirical and theoretical 
underpinnings of the marketplace of ideas trust fund. I will then describe the mechanics of the 
proposal in more detail. Next, I will evaluate the likely efficacy of the proposed regulation 
using the criteria enumerated earlier. Finally, I will consider potential criticisms that could be 
lodged against the trust fund. A discussion of key constitutional concerns will be reserved 
until the following section.  
How Political Advertisements Can Improve Viewpoint Diversity 
The empirical foundation for my proposal is a growing body of social science 
literature which suggests that political advertising campaigns can affect how journalists frame 
policy debates and enable minority viewpoints to achieve greater salience in the news.128 In 
short, this research suggests that policies designed to increase the number and variety of issue 
advertisements could dramatically improve the political information environment. A study 
that I conducted to examine media coverage of the Patients’ Bill of Rights debate in 1998 and 
1999 highlights how political advertising campaigns can contribute to viewpoint diversity.129  
In 1998, Congress proposed a Patients’ Bill of Rights that would have imposed new 
regulations on the managed care industry in response to perceived quality of care shortfalls. 
During the debate, a coalition of business interests and managed care companies sponsored 
extensive political advertising campaigns in five key states to foment opposition to the 
pending legislation. I compared newspaper coverage of the debate in these states with 
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coverage in five comparison states that were not directly exposed to the advocacy 
campaigns.130 Although media coverage and public opinion overwhelmingly supported 
managed care regulation at the time of the Patients’ Bill of Rights debate, newspaper coverage 
was 17 percent less likely to be supportive of managed care reform in states subject to the 
critical advertising campaigns.131 Moreover, the criticisms that were mentioned in the critical 
newspaper coverage were precisely those considerations mentioned in the negative advertising 
campaigns.132 Political advertisements may therefore contribute to viewpoint diversity and 
political learning by enabling minority viewpoints to achieve greater salience in the news.133 
The marketplace of ideas trust fund seeks to leverage these findings to ensure that a more 
diverse spectrum of viewpoints enter political discourse. 
The theoretical foundation for my proposal is social science research on political 
learning and the role of the interest groups, issue advertisements and the media in 
contemporary political debates. Matthew Baum, for example, has developed a byproduct 
model of political learning: due to selective political coverage by the entertainment-oriented, 
soft news media, otherwise politically inattentive individuals are exposed to political 
information as an incidental byproduct of seeking entertainment.134 If political learning can 
occur as a byproduct of entertainment-seeking behavior, then incidental exposure to political 
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advertisements in the course of normal television consumption could lead to increased levels 
of political awareness. Indeed, several studies suggest that political advertising campaigns can 
contribute to political learning.135 Moreover, there is ample opportunity for this byproduct 
learning to occur: the average American consumes over 5 hours of television per day.136 The 
marketplace of ideas trust fund seeks to leverage these insights to ensure that a diverse 
spectrum of viewpoints actually reaches the public. 
The Mechanics of the Proposal 
Which Political Advertisements Will Trigger the Marketplace of Ideas Tax? 
An obvious threshold question that must be addressed is how to determine which 
political advertisements will trigger the marketplace of ideas tax. The Supreme Court has 
disaggregated political advertisements into two functional categories: express advocacy and its 
functional equivalent, and genuine issue advocacy.137 The Court has characterized express 
advocacy as “communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate for federal office.”138 Express words of election or defeat include words 
such as vote for, elect, support, cast your ballot for, Smith for Congress, vote against, defeat, 
or reject.139 Advertisements are the functional equivalent of express advocacy “only if the ad is 
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135
 Martin Gilens, Lynn Vavreck and Martin Cohen, Mass Media and the Public’s Assessments of Presidential 
Candidates, 1952-2000, Journal of Politics 60 (November): 1160-1175, 1160 (2007). 
 
136
 Nielsen Company, Anywhere Anytime Media Measurement Three Screen Report: Television, Internet and 
Mobile Usage in the U.S. (2009). 
 
137
 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1976); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 
(2007). 
 
138
 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976). 
 
139
 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 fn 52 (1976). 
 75!
specific candidate.”140 Genuine issue advertisements, on the other hand, “focus on a legislative 
issue, take a position on the issue, exhort the public to adopt that position, and urge the public 
to contact public officials with respect to the matter.”141  
While the Court has treated these categories of advertising differently in its First 
Amendment jurisprudence, I will sidestep questions of constitutionality for now. Here, I 
weigh normative and pragmatic considerations to determine which advertisements should 
trigger the marketplace of ideas tax. Normatively, all political advertisements – express 
advocacy, its functional equivalent, and genuine issue ads – should be subject to the 
marketplace of ideas tax. To start, the contemporary media landscape has produced an 
attention spectrum scarcity problem: the public has a limited attention span for speech on 
political and social issues.142 Consequently, all political advertisements compete for limited 
public attention to public affairs messages,143 and the viewpoints that surface through the 
laissez-faire marketplace consume this scarce attention spectrum and contribute to the 
homogenization of political debate within mainstream parameters.144 If the homogenization of 
political discourse is conceptualized as a negative externality, then taxing all political 
advertisements alike is appealing because it forces each speaker to internalize a fair share of 
the negative externalities created by his speech. Much like the federal government prohibits 
monopolization to promote better functioning economic markets – which constrains the 
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activities of market participants – it may be necessary to regulate the participants in the 
marketplace of ideas to promote a better functioning democracy.145 Indeed, it may be fair to 
distribute the cost of improving viewpoint diversity to each speaker in direct proportion to 
how loudly he is speaking.  
  Pragmatism and concerns with regulatory efficiency also counsel in favor of subjecting 
all political advertisements to the marketplace of ideas tax. As a threshold matter, subjecting 
more advertisements to the tax will generate a larger pool of subsidies to sponsor speech by 
underrepresented viewpoints. Moreover, taxing every political advertisement that surfaces 
through the laissez-faire marketplace should improve the efficiency of the marketplace subsidy 
when compared to alternative approaches: it might incrementally suppress the loudest voices 
in public debates while simultaneously expanding the subsidy pool for underrepresented 
viewpoints, thereby promoting viewpoint diversity from both the top and bottom.  
Which Political Advertisements Are Eligible For the Marketplace of Ideas Subsidy? 
The next conceptual hurdle that must be addressed is determining which speakers 
and/or viewpoints are eligible to receive the subsidy. To reiterate, the marketplace of ideas 
subsidy would be used to promote viewpoints that are underrepresented in extant political 
debates. Consequently, only express advocacy, its functional equivalent, and genuine issue 
advertisements would be eligible for the subsidy. Two tasks remain, however. First, how can 
we determine which viewpoints qualify as underrepresented in an extant political debate? 
Second, should every political advertisement that promotes a qualifiedly underrepresented 
viewpoint be eligible for the subsidy? I will explore each question in turn. 
In his seminal article proposing a judicially enforceable First Amendment right of 
access to the press, Jerome Barron noted that considerations of administrative feasibility 
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would dictate that limitations on a right of access be carefully defined.146 Barron advocated the 
use of a contextual approach in which the degree to which an idea is suppressed or 
underrepresented by the local media is crucial to determining whether a right of access should 
be enforced.147 A contextual approach is particularly apropos to determine whether a 
particular viewpoint should be eligible for the marketplace of ideas subsidy. After all, how 
better to determine an effective way to improve the political information environment than by 
examining the environment itself? 
Determining when a particular viewpoint is underrepresented in an extant political 
debate can be disaggregated into two constituent inquiries, one definitional and one 
methodological. First, what does it mean for an idea to be underrepresented? 
Underrepresented relative to what? Second, how does one determine when an idea is in fact 
underrepresented? These are intractable problems, and it is perhaps unsurprising that previous 
commentators, including Barron, have dedicated scant attention to how one might determine 
when the media suppress or fail to represent particular viewpoints.148 Nonetheless, a few 
preliminary observations will be useful. 
One can posit several plausible definitions for what it means for a viewpoint to be 
underrepresented in political debate. For example, a viewpoint could be underrepresented if it 
appears in less than half of all media coverage of the debate. In the context of the health care 
reform debate under President Obama, for example, concerns about individual mandates or 
the role of the federal government would qualify as underrepresented viewpoints, while a 
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focus on partisanship and pork barrel politics would not.149 Critics would likely argue that this 
definition is too expansive, however, because too many mainstream viewpoints would qualify 
as underrepresented. During the Patients Bill of Rights debate in 1998 and 1999, for example, 
eight out of ten salient viewpoints identified in the debate would have qualified as 
underrepresented using this definition.150 Alternatively, a viewpoint could be underrepresented 
if it fails to meet some lower threshold of representation in media coverage of the debate. If 
the threshold were set at ten percent, for example, only three out of the ten viewpoints 
mentioned during the Patients Bill of Rights debate would have qualified for the subsidy.151 
Alternatively, if only those viewpoints that achieved the bottom decile of media coverage in 
the debate were eligible, then by definition only ten percent of all viewpoints would qualify for 
the subsidy. 
The definitions mentioned above all leverage how pervasive a viewpoint is in media 
coverage of the debate to determine whether it is in fact underrepresented. One could also 
imagine using vastly different criteria to define what it means for a viewpoint to be 
underrepresented in a debate. For example, one could rely on public opinion polling to gauge 
which viewpoints have permeated the public consciousness in a particular debate. A viewpoint 
could qualify as underrepresented if some predefined threshold of the public does not 
reference it when asked about the subject in a survey. If an animating principle behind the 
marketplace of ideas tax is that a diverse spectrum of viewpoints should reach the public, then 
a key benefit of using public opinion polling to determine what it means for a viewpoint to be 
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underrepresented is that it exploits the relevant endpoint – whether the public has internalized 
a particular message.  
Two salient critiques arise when contemplating the use of public opinion polling to 
determine which viewpoints should qualify as underrepresented. First, critics could argue that 
public opinion is not synonymous with the results of public opinion polls,152 and that polling 
is beleaguered by problems such as non-attitudes or the susceptibility of respondents to 
question wording or placement.153 While this position is not without merit, skillful survey 
research routinely produces results that are extremely accurate, credible and replicable.154 
Indeed, as the prominent pollster George Gallup once wrote, “polls are the chief hope of 
lifting government to a higher level…by providing a modus operandi for testing new ideas.”155 
Second, using the results of public opinion polls to determine when a viewpoint is 
underrepresented produces a circularity problem: if a significant percentage of the public does 
not reference a particular viewpoint when asked about a subject in a survey, then how can we 
discern which viewpoints are being omitted from the debate? One possible solution would be 
to convene a nonpartisan panel of experts – something akin to the National Academy of 
Sciences – to develop an inventory of relevant viewpoints inductively from media content, 
public discourse, and a review of the literature.156 Viewpoints that this panel determines are 
relevant for a particular debate, but that fail to achieve a predefined level of salience in 
subsequent public opinion polling, would then qualify as underrepresented. While this is 
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hardly a comprehensive discussion of what it means for an idea to be underrepresented in a 
political debate, hopefully it offers some useful insights. 
Once we have identified what it means for a viewpoint to be underrepresented in a 
political debate, how can we determine whether a particular viewpoint is actually 
underrepresented? As the preceding paragraph suggests, public opinion polling provides one 
plausible answer. Fortunately, there are other sound methodological approaches that can also 
be used to gauge how pervasive a particular viewpoint is in political debate. The most 
prevalent approach to measuring viewpoints in media coverage is manual content analysis.157 
Using this approach, individuals read, view or listen to large quantities of media coverage and 
code it for a predefined set of characteristics.158 In the case of the marketplace of ideas trust 
fund, coders would be searching for the frequency with which a particular viewpoint is present 
in coverage of a political debate.  
Critics of manual content analysis will assert that coding determinations are subjective 
and unreliable.159 Moreover, detractors might suggest that a viewpoint is a very subtle and 
nuanced concept that is not readily susceptible to large-scale coding. For example, a viewpoint 
could be disaggregated into informational, positional and tonal elements. These concerns 
certainly warrant careful consideration. As a preliminary rebuttal, however, it is worth 
reflecting on the fact that coding determinations can be subjected to scientific review, and 
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many statistical measures have been developed to assess the reliability of coding 
classifications.160 In addition, the potential subjectivity of manual coding determinations also 
permits this approach to be uniquely sensitive to the context in which a viewpoint appears – 
manual coders can potentially parse the informational, positional and tonal elements of a 
particular viewpoint.  Indeed, even critics concede that manual content analysis can be 
extremely useful when done well,161 and it has a long history in social science research.162  
More recently, developments in computer science and linguistics have enabled 
scholars to use automated computational language processing to analyze large quantities of 
news coverage.163 This approach has several advantages over manual content analysis. First, it 
eschews the potential subjectivity of manual coding determinations. Second, it leverages the 
computing power of automation, which may be necessary for an endeavor as intensive as 
scouring prodigious amounts of media coverage of manifold political debates. A key weakness 
of this approach, however, is that computational language processing is not as sensitive to 
context as manual content analysis. It is very difficult, for example, for a language-processing 
program to detect sarcasm. While each approach has its own strengths and limitations, public 
opinion polling, manual content analysis and automated computational language processing 
provide three tested and plausible ways to measure the degree to which an idea is 
underrepresented in public debate.  
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How Will the Marketplace of Ideas Subsidy Be Rationed? 
While the normative and theoretical foundations for the marketplace of ideas trust 
fund counsel that every underrepresented viewpoint should be eligible to receive the subsidy, 
it seems likely that innumerable viewpoints could legitimately claim to be underrepresented in 
countless political debates throughout the country. Consequently, some sort of a rationing 
mechanism may be necessary to determine which qualifiedly underrepresented viewpoints 
receive the trust fund subsidy. Several potential rationing mechanisms are readily apparent, 
each of which has different strengths and weaknesses.  
First, the marketplace of ideas subsidy could be rationed on a first come first served 
basis. One advantage of this approach is that it is objective and does not discriminate against 
divergent or unpopular viewpoints. Indeed, courts have previously held that a first come first 
served system is a reasonable way to ration scare resources precisely because it does not allow 
for discrimination based on the content of an applicant's speech.164 That said, a first come first 
served system might be an unacceptably blunt instrument to ration the trust fund. If the 
objective of the marketplace of ideas subsidy is to improve viewpoint diversity in extant 
political debates, then the subsidized speech must enter political debates in a timely manner. 
Timeliness may be even more important, moreover, because the Downsian issue-attention 
cycle suggests that public attention is unlikely to remain fixed on a particular issue for a 
prolonged period of time.165 Consequently, advertisements that are not aired 
contemporaneously with a heated political debate can hardly be expected to change the 
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contours of the debate or the process of public opinion formation on the issue. A first come 
first served system may be unacceptable, therefore, because proponents of underrepresented 
viewpoints could be waiting in the subsidy queue while the key phases of the debate transpire. 
A lottery system could also be employed to ration the marketplace of ideas subsidy. 
Like the first come first served approach, a lottery system would be objective and would not 
disqualify any idea because it is too divergent or unpopular. Each potential recipient of the 
subsidy would have an equal chance to obtain funding. Like the first come first served 
approach, however, a lottery system also seems to be an unacceptably blunt instrument. It 
seems implausible to suggest that every underrepresented viewpoint will contribute equally to 
the democratic ideals of deliberation, accountability and an informed citizenry. Some 
viewpoints might address issues that affect an extremely circumscribed set of individuals, 
while others may be underrepresented precisely because the majority wisely rejected them as 
imprudent and impracticable. Consequently, the ideal rationing mechanism should be able to 
distinguish between competing viewpoints in order to promote “more valuable” 
underrepresented viewpoints. 
If we accept the premise that not every underrepresented viewpoint is created equal, it 
becomes important to consider how a rationing mechanism can differentiate among 
competing viewpoints in an equitable and efficient manner. Accepting this premise should 
not, for example, lead to the conclusion that a cadre of “enlightened” individuals should 
somehow adjudge the relative merits of different viewpoints. Such a proposal recalls a classic 
dilemma of democratic politics: who will guard the guardians? Indeed, it is essential that the 
rationing mechanism not delegate exceedingly broad discretion to any actor or group of 
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actors.166 Consequently, it is important to enumerate a set of equitable and enforceable criteria 
that could be used to ascertain which viewpoints are most deserving of subsidization. While I 
do not purport to develop a comprehensive list of possible criteria, an exploratory discussion 
should provide a useful point of departure for future thought and analysis. 
I previously argued that promoting diverse and underrepresented viewpoints might be 
a necessary antidote to the influence of money in broadcasting and politics today. One 
possible criterion that could be used to ration the marketplace of ideas subsidy, therefore, is 
the amount of money that has been spent on countervailing advertisements. If $200 million 
has been spent on political advertising to influence the health care reform debate, for example, 
an advertisement trumpeting a viewpoint that has been underrepresented in that debate would 
receive priority over an advertisement addressing an aspect of a less prominent debate. This 
criterion would thus prioritize counterspeech that responds to more prolific and prodigious 
advertising campaigns. A key benefit of this criterion is that it would target issues that are 
presumably higher on the political and/or public agenda. An obvious downside of this 
criterion, however, is that speech targeting such prolific issues could be plagued by 
diminishing returns: adding one voice to an already potent constellation of voices might have 
a de minimis impact on the debate. On the other hand, one voice can literally change the 
contours of an important political debate. Consider the fabled Harry and Louise 
advertisement that aired during the Clinton health care reform debate, for example.167 
A second criterion that could be used to ration the marketplace of ideas subsidy is 
requiring each eligible advertisement to reach some predefined viability threshold, where a 
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viable perspective is defined as one that would potentially be accepted by the public. Recall 
that the Fair Elections Now Act required political candidates to raise small contributions from 
hundreds or thousands of individual donors to qualify for a public financing scheme.168 
Similarly, every potential recipient of the marketplace of ideas subsidy could be required to 
meet some viability threshold – for example, by obtaining 500 small financial contributions in 
support of the proposed advertisement. Like the criticisms that I lodged against the Fair 
Elections Now Act, however, this criterion could perform an undesirable mainstreaming 
function and constrain the spectrum of ideas that are eligible for subsidization. Nonetheless, it 
may not be wholly undesirable to incrementally constrain the spectrum of viewpoints that are 
eligible for subsidization. As I stated earlier, some viewpoints may be underrepresented in 
extant debates precisely because they have already been considered and rejected by the 
majority. Perhaps requiring the proponent of an underrepresented viewpoint to obtain 500 
contributions in order to be eligible for the trust fund subsidy is an effective way to limit the 
trust fund to ideas that the public might conceivably consider. Alternatively, potential 
recipients of the subsidy could be required to obtain the endorsement of a responsible elected 
official to signify that the majority of concerned citizens have not rejected the viewpoint as 
impolitic or parochial. 
 If we can enumerate an acceptable set of objective and enforceable criteria to ascertain 
which viewpoints are most deserving of subsidization, it might then be possible to charge a 
governmental agency – perhaps the FCC or a newly created Viewpoint Diversity Commission 
(“VDC”) – with the task of overseeing the marketplace of ideas subsidy. The governmental 
agency would thus be charged with determining which advertisements trigger the marketplace 
of ideas tax and which advertisements are eligible for the subsidy. Of course, it would be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168
 S. 1285, sec. 102, § 505(a).  
 86!
essential that the agency not be delegated broad discretion to allocate the subsidy. Instead, the 
agency would function primarily as a legal public accountability regime.169 The discretion of 
these agency officials would be highly circumscribed, and they would more or less 
mechanically apply the eligibility criteria. If the trust fund were insufficient to subsidize every 
advertisement that is eligible, for example, a lottery could then be used to ration the subsidy 
among the eligible and deserving viewpoints. Moreover, the judgments of the agency could be 
challenged by aggrieved parties and subjected to administrative and judicial review. 
What Restrictions Will Be Imposed on the Use of the Subsidy? 
Finally, to ensure the efficacy of the marketplace of ideas trust fund, it is necessary to 
specify restrictions on how the advertising subsidy can be used. One obvious concern that 
must be addressed whenever a public subsidy program coexists alongside a traditional 
marketplace is the potential for crowd out, which is a reduction in private investment due to 
increased government spending.170 As eligibility for the marketplace of ideas subsidy expands, 
groups that already planned to sponsor political advertisements may opt for financing from 
the trust fund in lieu of paying for the advertisement through traditional market mechanisms. 
This would result in deadweight loss and significantly reduce the efficacy of the trust fund: the 
costs of the program will rise without a commensurate increase in viewpoint diversity. While 
some crowd out is likely unavoidable, imposing restrictions on recipients of the subsidy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169
!For a discussion of accountability regimes, see, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: 
Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in Michael W. Dowdle, ed., Public Accountability: Designs, 
Dilemma and Experiences 115-156 (2006) (“For example, in a legal public accountability regime, public officials 
are responsible to individuals and firms, about their respect or lack of respect for legal requirements or legal 
rights through processs of administrative and judicial review, judged in accordance with law, resulting in either 
validation or nullification of official acts…This legal regime is structured by a host of doctrines, rules and norms 
that define who has ‘standing’ to complain (to whom), who is a public authority subject to public law norms 
(who), what sorts of claims qualify as ‘legal’ claims and are thus ‘justiciable’ (about what), through what 
procedures administrative or judicial consideration can be obtained (what process), and the limits on the 
reviewing body’s competence.”). 
 
170
 See, e.g., David M. Cutler and Jonathan Gruber, Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111(2): 391-430, 391 (1996). 
 87!
should ameliorate the size of the deadweight loss. In the campaign finance context, for 
example, the government is permitted to impose restrictions on campaign spending when a 
candidate voluntarily accepts public funding.171 These campaign finance laws do not 
unlawfully suppress speech because the candidates opt into the spending limits voluntarily.172 
By analogy, imposing spending restrictions on political advertisements when a sponsor 
voluntarily accepts public funding should also survive a First Amendment challenge. 
Evaluating the Proposal: Will It Improve Viewpoint Diversity? 
Does the Proposal Promote a Diverse Spectrum of Viewpoints? 
 Recall that I dismissed substantive media regulation, laissez-faire policies, and 
candidate-centered approaches to promoting viewpoint diversity as suboptimal. In each case, I 
argued that the parties charged with promoting viewpoint diversity – broadcast licensees, 
media conglomerates, and political candidates – were inherently incapable of promoting a 
truly diverse spectrum of viewpoints in extant political debates. Perhaps the greatest strength 
of the marketplace of ideas trust fund, therefore, is that it entrusts the goal of promoting 
viewpoint diversity directly to the public.  
 There are several reasons that the general public should be entrusted with the task of 
improving viewpoint diversity in political debates. First, adherents of a viewpoint that is 
underrepresented in a debate will have the most concrete and particularized interest in 
disseminating that viewpoint to the broader public. Existing social science research suggests 
that individuals with a personal agenda or stake in an issue can raise citizens’ consciousness on 
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social and political issues,173 thereby adding richness and diversity to extant political debates. 
Second, agency officials, politicians or a similarly circumscribed set of individuals may be 
unable to anticipate the full panoply of potential viewpoints in a particular debate. 
Alternatively, these individuals might conclude that certain underrepresented viewpoints do 
not merit an increased share of the public attention spectrum. But surely democratic theory 
and the belief that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market”174 militate against any viewpoint or content-based restrictions 
in political debates. On the contrary, the free and full discussion of competing perspectives is 
the best way to foster debate and improve the quality of political discourse.175  
In short, the marketplace of ideas subsidy is a mechanism to correct for the market 
imperfections that have precluded the laissez-faire broadcast marketplace from realizing the 
vast potentialities of the medium. For “truth” or more nuanced political discussion to emerge 
from the broadcast marketplace, every idea or viewpoint must have at least a chance to 
compete and prevail in the market. At present, those with extensive institutional and financial 
resources have greater access to the tools of mass communication,176 and are able to “skew 
public discussion” in favor of their interests.177 Rather than allow nongovernmental 
constraints on public discourse to operate unchecked, the marketplace of ideas subsidy will 
empower the broader public to engage in political debates in a more meaningful way.   
Does the Proposal Enable a Diverse Range of Viewpoints to Actually Reach the Public? 
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Recall that I questioned whether substantive media regulation, laissez-faire policies, or 
candidate-centered approaches to promoting viewpoint diversity can ever ensure that a diverse 
spectrum of viewpoints actually reach the public. Key obstacles included regulatory vagueness, 
audience fragmentation, attention spectrum scarcity, high barriers to market entry and unduly 
restrictive rationing mechanisms. The marketplace of ideas trust fund, in contrast, leverages 
insights from the social sciences to help ensure that a message delivered to the public is in fact 
a message received. To that end, the trust fund proposal alters the political information 
environment so that both active and passive consumers of political information should be 
exposed to an improved multiplicity and diversity of voices. 
The marketplace of ideas trust fund should expose active consumers of political 
information to a more diverse spectrum of viewpoints due to the effect of political 
advertisements on journalistic framing of policy debates.178 If political advertisements can 
affect the terms that journalists use to discuss policy proposals, the questions journalists ask, 
and the perspectives they choose to emphasize,179 then policies designed to increase the 
multiplicity and diversity of political advertisements should enrich the political information 
environment by changing the constellation of terms, questions and perspectives that 
journalists highlight in extant political debates. One of the great virtues of this approach, 
therefore, is that it can overcome problems associated with audience fragmentation because 
political advertisements can enable minority viewpoints to achieve greater salience in the 
news.180 Consequently, these advertisements can improve the political information 
environment even for those individuals who do not view the message directly. Returning to 
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the Clinton health care reform debate in 1993 and 1994, for example, the Harry and Louise 
advertisements changed the terms of the debate for everyone, not only for those individuals 
who viewed the ads.181 
The marketplace of ideas trust fund should also expose politically inattentive 
individuals and passive consumers of political information to a more diverse spectrum of 
viewpoints. Based on byproduct models of political learning, incidental exposure to political 
advertisements can improve levels of political knowledge,182 circumvent the public’s limited 
attention span for speech on political and social issues,183 and overcome audience 
fragmentation because advertisements can be aired on Fox News and PBS alike. In short, the 
trust fund should be able to promote political learning and improved diversity of expression in 
a way that resonates with a heterogeneous population. 
Potential Objections 
Perhaps the most salient objection that can be lodged against the regulatory 
framework advanced in this article is that a political advertising subsidy is simply inapposite in 
the contemporary media landscape. In an age of abundant media speech, for example, 
flooding individuals with more speech may counterproductively dull their senses and diminish 
their ability to discern quality or truth in political debates.184 Alternatively, individuals may 
simply avoid the newly subsidized speech altogether. Ellen Goodman, for example, has 
modeled a “digital mediascape” in which audience control and content abundance have 
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replaced the previous conditions of audience passivity and content scarcity.185 Consequently, 
media regulations designed to improve the information environment might be futile if 
audiences do not consume the information that the regulation elicits. Finally, the multiplicity 
of forums for novel and unpopular ideas – the Internet, blogs, and e-mail – may have relieved 
some of the distortions in our political discourse186 and rendered a marketplace of ideas 
subsidy superfluous. 
Although political advertisements may seem like an antiquated way to improve 
viewpoint diversity in light of content abundance and the Internet, there are convincing 
reasons to believe that the marketplace of ideas subsidy will improve the political information 
environment in meaningful ways. First, the average American watches over 5 hours of 
television per day.187 Thus, most individuals will be exposed to myriad advertisements on a 
daily basis, and political advertisements can contribute to political learning by exposing 
otherwise inattentive individuals to political information.188 Second, television remains the 
primary source of news189 and political information for most Americans,190 and broadcast 
news viewers generally do not seek out alternative sources of information despite the 
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increasing abundance of political information available via new media.191 Thus, politically 
attentive individuals will also likely be exposed to new information from diverse and 
underrepresented viewpoints while watching the news. Finally, political advertising campaigns 
may influence journalistic framing of policy debates and enable minority viewpoints to achieve 
greater salience in newspaper coverage.192 Thus, even if individuals are able to avoid direct 
exposure to unwanted political advertisements, they may internalize the messages conveyed in 
the ads when reading other media coverage of ongoing political debates. 
A second possible critique is that the marketplace of ideas subsidy will be ineffective 
because self-financed corporations and political action committees can still set the parameters 
of extant political debates by flooding the market with their own advertisements. Admittedly, 
the constellation of voices that dominate political debates today will likely still dominate 
political debates tomorrow even if something resembling the marketplace of ideas trust fund 
were enacted. Moreover, groups that are reliant on the marketplace of ideas subsidy may 
suffer discredit before they can respond with a counter-advertisement.193 While there is some 
validity to these criticisms, it is worth noting that the marketplace of ideas subsidy does not 
seek absolute equality in political voice. Instead, it merely seeks to improve political discourse 
incrementally by enabling diverse and underrepresented viewpoints to achieve a foothold in 
contemporary debates. Although the marketplace of ideas subsidy is not a panacea, it is still 
worthwhile for government to promote the public interest in robust political debates against 
the tide of market forces. 
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Finally, the regulatory framework advanced in this article could also be criticized as 
either being too incipient or simply impolitic. One could imagine various and sundry 
objections. If advertisements sponsored by political candidates are subjected to the 
marketplace of ideas tax, for example, then candidates will be forced to raise even more 
prodigious amounts of money to run for office, thereby exacerbating the undue influence of 
money in politics.194 Others might argue that the incidence of the tax will enable broadcasters 
to capture the subsidy and/or raise advertising prices. Still others might contend that political 
advertisements will exert a less robust influence on journalistic framing of political debates if 
the market is saturated with competing ad campaigns. Indeed, these objections are not without 
merit. However, the primary aim of this proposal is to reinvigorate the agenda for regulating 
to promote viewpoint diversity. Hopefully it has provided innovative ideas, answered some 
important questions and flagged key issues for further consideration. 
Constitutional Concerns 
When describing the mechanics of the marketplace of ideas tax above, I noted that all 
political advertisements – express advocacy, its functional equivalent, and genuine issue ads – 
should be subject to the tax. However, this funding scheme undoubtedly raises First 
Amendment concerns. Regulations that burden political speech are subjected to strict scrutiny, 
which requires a showing that the regulation furthers a compelling governmental interest and 
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.195 Moreover, the Supreme Court has invalidated 
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myriad regulations that burden political speech under this exacting standard.196 In fact, two 
recent Supreme Court cases – Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission197 and Federal 
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life198 – will likely pose an insuperable 
constitutional barrier to the regulatory scheme developed in this article.  
Two obvious alternatives present themselves in the likely event that the marketplace of 
ideas tax cannot survive a constitutional challenge while Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito remain on the Court. First, there are favorable Supreme Court precedents 
which suggest that the regulation could survive strict scrutiny in a different jurisprudential 
environment. This alternative essentially constitutes a wait-and-see approach, and I will 
explore these precedents while discussing Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life. 
Second, the marketplace of ideas subsidy could be endowed through a funding mechanism 
that does not burden political speech, thereby avoiding strict scrutiny. I will discuss this 
alternative after examining the constitutional barriers imposed by Citizens United and 
Wisconsin Right to Life. 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court invalidated 
provisions of a federal statute that barred corporations and unions from using their general 
treasury funds to expressly advocate the election or defeat of a political candidate or to 
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broadcast an electioneering communication199 within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days 
of a general election.200 In reaching its decision, the Court evinced a marked hostility toward 
any regulation that reduces the overall quantity of political speech.201 The Court explained that 
a restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the 
audience reached.”202 In contrast, the Court upheld the statute’s disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements, observing that these requirements “impose no ceiling on campaign-related 
activities”203 and “do not prevent anyone from speaking.”204 In short, Citizens United endorses 
a robust vision of free speech as serving political liberty, and manifests skepticism of any 
governmental efforts to suppress speech or skew the private ordering of ideas.205 
If Justice Marshall was correct when he asserted that the power to tax involves the 
power to destroy,206 then Citizens United ostensibly erects a formidable barrier to levying a ten 
percent marketplace of ideas tax on all political advertisements. Indeed, the quantity of 
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political advertising purchased in the economic marketplace can be expected to decrease after 
the imposition of a unit tax,207 raising the specter that the regulation would be unconstitutional 
following Citizens United. However, there are two reasons to believe that this thorny 
precedent may not pose an insurmountable constitutional barrier for the proposed regulation. 
First, the marketplace of ideas tax will not necessarily cause political advertising to decrease in 
the aggregate. Second, the regulation should improve the quality of political debate. Each of 
these justifications will be explored in more detail below. 
Although the Roberts Court is skeptical of regulations that might reduce the quantity 
of political speech, it is unclear whether the marketplace of ideas tax would reduce political 
advertising in the aggregate. This ambiguity stems from the fact that although the imposition 
of the tax will likely reduce the quantity of political advertising purchased in the economic 
marketplace, the revenues generated by the tax will be used to create and subsidize a 
secondary marketplace for advertisements sponsored by underrepresented viewpoints. The 
number of political advertisements that are subsidized by the marketplace of ideas tax (but 
were unable to surface in the unfettered laissez-faire marketplace) could offset the number of 
advertisements that disappear from the economic marketplace as a result of the tax. Whether 
the regulation will produce a net gain or a net loss in the aggregate quantity of political 
advertising will depend on the elasticity of demand for advertisements in both the laissez-faire 
market and the secondary market created by the regulation.208 In short, it is unclear what effect 
the imposition of the marketplace of ideas tax would have on political advertising in the 
aggregate. 
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The marketplace of ideas tax could also retain its vitality after Citizens United if it 
improves the quality of political debate. Recall the Court’s threefold concern that the statute at 
issue would (1) restrict the number of issues discussed, (2) reduce the depth of their 
exploration, and (3) reduce the size of the audience reached.209 Notably, the marketplace of 
ideas tax was consciously designed to address the Court’s first two concerns: the marketplace 
of ideas subsidy will increase the number of issues discussed and improve the depth of their 
exploration by promoting viewpoints that are currently underrepresented in public debates. 
Significantly, the Court has previously upheld regulations that burden speech if the presumed 
effect of the regulation is one of “enhancing the volume and quality of coverage” of public 
issues.210 Since political advertising campaigns can influence journalistic framing of policy 
debates and enable minority viewpoints to achieve greater salience in the news,211 it is at least 
plausible that the marketplace of ideas tax could survive a constitutional challenge.  
Hopefully the two preceding paragraphs suggest that Citizens United need not 
inexorably be viewed as a barrier to the constitutionality of the marketplace of ideas tax. 
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the proposed regulatory framework could survive a 
constitutional challenge while Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito remain on 
the Court. While cases like Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce212 and McConnell v. 
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FEC213 articulated an egalitarian vision of free speech to sustain regulations that burdened 
political speech, Citizens United represents “a triumph of the libertarian over the egalitarian 
vision of free speech.”214 Although the statute at issue in Citizens United215 could have 
reasonably been characterized as a viewpoint-neutral time, place and manner restriction,216 the 
majority repeatedly attacked it as an outright ban on speech.217 The vision of free-speech-as-
liberty articulated in Citizens United suggests that the Roberts Court will reject governmental 
efforts to equalize speaking power and treat redistributive limits on speech as a cardinal First 
Amendment sin.218 Consequently, it seems clear that the marketplace of ideas tax would fare 
better in a different jurisprudential environment. 
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life 
The Supreme Court has recognized myriad governmental interests as sufficient to 
justify the regulation of campaign speech. For example, the Court has previously recognized 
compelling governmental interests in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, 
preventing corruption, sustaining the active responsibility of the individual citizen for the wise 
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conduct of the government, and maintaining the individual citizen's confidence in 
government.219 In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, however, the 
Court held that the interests which justify restricting campaign speech and its functional 
equivalent do not justify restricting genuine issue advocacy.220 In fact, the Court stated that it 
has never recognized a compelling interest in regulating ads that are neither express advocacy 
nor its functional equivalent.221 This expansive statement raises serious questions about 
whether the marketplace of ideas tax – which would tax express advocacy, its functional 
equivalent, and genuine issue ads – could survive strict scrutiny. 
Although the Court has not previously identified a compelling governmental interest 
that would justify regulating genuine issue advocacy, it has suggested some conditions under 
which it might do so. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court invalidated a 
state statute that barred corporate expenditures on some referenda but not others because no 
compelling governmental interest was served by the law.222 However, the Court acknowledged 
that it might uphold restrictions on genuine issue advocacy by corporations if there were 
evidence that “corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, 
thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests.”223 The Court invalidated 
the statute in Bellotti, however, because neither the record nor legislative findings indicated 
that “the relative voice of corporations [had] been overwhelming or even significant in 
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influencing” referenda in the state.224 Nonetheless, Bellotti creates a toehold for articulating a 
compelling governmental interest that could be sufficient to justify the regulation of genuine 
issue advocacy. The obvious question presented, therefore, is whether the conditions 
identified in Bellotti might be extended to bolster the constitutionality of the marketplace of 
ideas tax. 
The two primary governmental interests served by the proposed marketplace of ideas 
regulation are cultivating a more informed citizenry and improving the depth and diversity of 
democratic dialogue. One of the evils that the regulation is designed to address, moreover, is 
that corporate advocacy may threaten to undermine democratic processes. Numerous scholars 
have suggested that corporate advocacy can affect how the media frame public debates,225 
while others have suggested that pressure from corporate advertisers contributes to the 
homogenization of broadcast programming.226 Consequently, the marketplace of ideas 
regulation seeks to promote underrepresented viewpoints as a way to enrich democratic 
discourse. While these interests are certainly within the ambit of Bellotti, and thus might serve 
as the basis for regulating genuine issue advocacy, two hurdles remain. First, recall that the 
Court struck down the statute in Bellotti due to a dearth of evidence that corporate advocacy 
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was actually denigrating First Amendment values.227 Thus, it is important to consider what 
evidence can be marshaled to bolster the constitutionality of the marketplace of ideas 
regulation. Second, the astute observer will ask whether the proffered governmental interests 
can withstand the Court’s holding in Buckley v. Valeo.228 These obstacles will be considered in 
more detail below. 
The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of a 
legislative judgment varies with the novelty or plausibility of the justification offered.229 As a 
threshold matter, therefore, it is worth noting that the concern that corporate advocacy 
threatens to undermine democratic processes is hardly novel. Justice Stevens, for example, 
evinced this precise concern in his Citizens United dissent, stating that “corporate 
domination” of the airwaves prior to elections will drown out non-corporate voices,230 thereby 
impeding a necessary precondition for democratic self-government.231 Moreover, a substantial 
corpus of academic research suggests that corporate advocacy may impair the political 
information environment and threaten democratic values. For example, corporate advocacy 
can affect how the media frame public debates and how much news coverage a particular 
issue receives,232 and pressure from corporate advertisers may contribute to bland and 
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homogenous broadcast programming.233 In short, the Court should not demand a prodigious 
body of empirical evidence to sustain the legislative judgment that regulating issue advertising 
may improve democratic discourse and the information environment. To that end, advocates 
of the marketplace of ideas regulation might point to a nascent but growing body of empirical 
evidence which suggests that political advertising campaigns affect how newspapers frame 
coverage of political debates, contribute to political learning, and enable minority viewpoints 
to achieve greater salience in the news.234 
Even if proponents of the marketplace of ideas regulation can articulate a compelling 
governmental interest and generate a legislative record to support the constitutionality of the 
proposal, the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckley v. Valeo may still pose a formidable 
obstacle. In Buckley, the Court stated that “the concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”235 Consequently, the Court could invalidate the 
marketplace of ideas tax and subsidy scheme as an impermissible attempt to equalize the 
relative voice of different segments of society. Buckley’s pronouncement against equalization 
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of voice may be a uniquely salient obstacle, moreover, due to its centrality to the majority’s 
analysis in Citizens United.236  
It is not clear, however, that the Court majority will adhere to this viewpoint in 
perpetuity. In McConnell, for example, the Court upheld restrictions on corporate campaign 
speech and its functional equivalent in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.237 
In doing so, the Court permitted the legislature to restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others, backtracking from Buckley’s 
pronouncement that speech equalization is an impermissible legislative goal.238 Similarly, 
Justice Stevens argued in Citizens United that “the Constitution does, in fact, permit 
numerous restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a few from drowning out the 
many: for example, restrictions on ballot access and on legislators’ floor time.”239 Indeed, the 
egalitarian vision of the First Amendment has an older pedigree in the Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence than the libertarian view adopted in Citizens United.240 Consequently, the belief 
that political equality is prior to speech may predominate again. If and when it does, 
regulations designed to enhance political equality could prevail over freedom of speech 
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concerns.241 Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the Roberts Court has interpreted 
the First Amendment as a negative check on government tyranny. As a result, Wisconsin 
Right to Life and Buckley will continue to constitute an insuperable obstacle for the 
marketplace of ideas regulation until the composition of the Court changes. 
Alternative Funding Mechanisms 
It seems clear that the marketplace of ideas tax cannot survive a constitutional 
challenge while Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito remain on the Court. 
Although I have outlined several precedents which suggest that the regulation could survive 
strict scrutiny in a different jurisprudential environment, it is also worth considering whether 
the marketplace of ideas subsidy could be endowed through a funding mechanism that does 
not burden political speech, thereby avoiding strict scrutiny. Although there are numerous 
funding schemes that would satisfy this criterion, I will proceed by examining the 
constitutionality of the proposed regulation if it were formulated as a subsidy funded through 
general revenues. A parsimonious treatment of the possible funding mechanisms will allow for 
a fuller exploration of the key constitutional elements.! 
Public Forum Doctrine 
Public forum doctrine dictates that the government can sometimes be required to 
permit the use of its property for communicative purposes without engaging in content 
discrimination. Public forum doctrine also recognizes, however, that the use of government 
property for communicative purposes can at times be restricted to certain speakers or for talk 
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about certain subjects.242 In fact, content distinctions are the norm when government speaks 
or otherwise subsidizes speech.243 Thus, public forum doctrine may permit the government to 
create a limited public forum that is restricted to speech on issues that are underrepresented in 
contemporary political debates. The question presented, therefore, is whether the Court’s 
public forum jurisprudence would permit something akin to the marketplace of ideas subsidy 
to promote underrepresented viewpoints. 
In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, the Supreme Court stated that the necessities 
of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may 
justify reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.244 Applied to the 
marketplace of ideas subsidy, the limited purpose of the forum is to enrich democratic debate 
by promoting underrepresented viewpoints. Consequently, the forum would exclude speech 
that is already adequately represented in public debates. To determine if the exclusion of a 
class of speech from a limited public forum is legitimate, however, the Court must distinguish 
between content discrimination and viewpoint discrimination. Content discrimination may be 
permissible if it preserves the purposes of the limited public forum, while viewpoint 
discrimination is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the 
forum's limitations.245  
Reserving the marketplace of ideas subsidy for certain groups or for the discussion of 
certain topics should be permissible under Rosenberger because it preserves the purpose of 
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the limited forum – enriching democratic debate. Current law affords the government 
substantial leeway to engage in content discrimination when creating a special forum,246 and 
promoting content that is already salient in extant political debates would frustrate the stated 
goal of improving the depth and diversity of democratic discourse. Moreover, limiting the 
forum to only underrepresented viewpoints should not be characterized as impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination. The government frequently eschews viewpoint-neutral standards 
when administering public programs,247 and speech by “majority” or “mainstream” viewpoints 
is not speech that is otherwise within the forum’s limitations. 
Government Speech 
To assess the constitutionality of a marketplace of ideas subsidy program, it is 
important to ascertain whether the government is engaging in its own expressive conduct or 
providing a forum for private speech.248 The distinction is important because the Free Speech 
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government 
speech.249 In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Court held that permitting privately 
donated monuments to be erected in a public park is a form of government speech and is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
246
 John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1166 (2005). 
 
247
 See, e.g., John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1123 (2005) (evaluations of scholarly and 
scientific merit, for example, necessarily include some consideration of whether the speaker's viewpoint is 
reasonable); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 206-08 (2003) (recognizing that public libraries 
enjoy substantial discretion when selecting materials on the basis of quality and appropriateness, and are not held 
to viewpoint-neutral standards); Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes 523 U.S. 666, 673-75 (1998) 
(recognizing that public television stations are required to make viewpoint-based decisions when selecting 
programming, and that these programming decisions do not typically violate the First Amendment). 
 
248
 Cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 29 S.Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (discussing whether the city was engaging in 
its own expressive conduct or providing a forum for the expression of private speech when it permitted privately 
donated monuments to be erected in a municipal park). 
 
249
 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 29 S.Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (citing Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 
544 U.S. 550, 553, 125 S.Ct. 2055, 161 L.Ed.2d 896 (2005) (“[T]he Government's own speech ... is exempt from 
First Amendment scrutiny”). 
 107!
therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.250 The Court reasoned that 
public forum principles are inapplicable when a government property or program is incapable 
of accommodating a large number of public speakers without defeating the essential function 
of the land or program.251 If governments were forced to maintain viewpoint neutrality in 
selecting donated monuments – which would be required by the public forum doctrine – then 
they would have little choice but to face cluttered parks or refuse all such donations. The 
Court concluded, therefore, that public forum analysis was inapplicable because it would lead 
almost inexorably to the closing of the forum.252 
The marketplace of ideas subsidy program might similarly be characterized as 
government speech and therefore immune from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. Like a 
public park, a government program designed to improve the political information 
environment by trumpeting underrepresented viewpoints cannot accommodate a large 
number of speakers without defeating the essential function of the program. Indeed, a strict 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality would force the government to either accept political 
advertisements aplenty – thereby rendering the program ineffectual and undermining its stated 
goal of enriching debate by promoting only underrepresented viewpoints – or otherwise 
refuse all such advertisements. Pleasant Grove dictates, however, that public forum doctrine 
does not present the government with such a Hobson’s choice. 
Government Subsidy of Speech 
The government may engage in viewpoint discrimination when providing subsidies for 
speech if it makes clear that the purpose of the subsidy is to promote a particular point of 
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view or if the discrimination occurs in the context of a government program that inherently 
involves viewpoint discrimination.253 Indeed, a line of cases beginning with National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley254 strongly suggests that the marketplace of ideas program 
should survive First Amendment scrutiny if formulated as a subsidy funded through general 
revenues. In Finley, the Court upheld a statute requiring the National Endowment for the 
Arts to evaluate grant applications according to artistic excellence and artistic merit, taking 
into account general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the 
public.255 The Court’s holding hinged on two key findings. First, the Court found that the 
government does not indiscriminately encourage a diversity of views from private speakers in 
the context of arts funding.256 On the contrary, the excellence threshold for artistic grants is 
inherently content-based. Second, the Court stated that the First Amendment has limited 
application in the subsidy context, observing that “government may allocate competitive 
funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a 
criminal penalty at stake.”257 Justices Scalia and Thomas adopted an even more extreme 
position in concurrence, stating that the First Amendment is inapplicable when government 
subsidizes speech.258 
The two key rationales that undergird the Court’s holding in Finley provide a strong 
argument in favor of the constitutionality of the marketplace of ideas regulation when 
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formulated as a subsidy. First, the marketplace of ideas subsidy program can be analogized to 
arts funding insofar as the government does not indiscriminately encourage a diversity of 
views from private speakers in either setting. On the contrary, the marketplace of ideas 
subsidy would encourage speech from underrepresented viewpoints in order to improve the 
depth and diversity of democratic discourse. Moreover, the Court has endorsed this legislative 
goal elsewhere, stating that “the government may subsidize speakers that it thinks provide 
novel points of view.”259 Second, the Court observed that the First Amendment has limited 
application in the subsidy context, which suggests that subsidizing only underrepresented 
viewpoints may not raise constitutional concerns. Furthermore, the position adopted by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas indicates that two members of the Citizens United majority would 
presumably support the marketplace of ideas program if designed as a straightforward subsidy.  
Conclusion 
It is time for students of media regulation to revisit the FCC’s historical commitment 
to meeting the basic needs of American politics and culture, over and above what the 
marketplace may or may not provide. If our democratic aspirations counsel a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust and wide-open, the current state of broadcast programming and political debate should 
be disconcerting. In a world in which political debate is homogenized within mainstream 
parameters, broadcasters eschew coverage of controversial issues, and moneyed interests 
expend millions of dollars trying to define the contours of public debates, media policy should 
consciously promote diverse and underrepresented viewpoints in an effort to improve the 
political information environment and produce a more informed citizenry. To do so, media 
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policy must simultaneously promote a diverse spectrum of viewpoints that are 
underrepresented in political debates and ensure that these viewpoints actually reach the 
public. A reasoned analysis suggests that extant approaches to promoting viewpoint diversity 
– including substantive media regulation, laissez-faire policies, and candidate-centered 
approaches – will not meet these goals. Hopefully this article suggests that policies designed to 
increase the number and variety of political advertisements could dramatically improve the 
political information environment. While the marketplace of ideas trust fund proposal may be 
imperfect and in need of further refinement, it is my hope that this article helps reinvigorate 
the agenda for regulating to promote viewpoint diversity in contemporary political debates. 
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